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ABSTRACT
Brazil's transformation from an agriculturally-based colonial economy to an industrial
republic spans seven decades - from the 1930s to the present - with three rapid growth
phases which were each followed by economic and social chaos. Three administrations
of different political persuasions implemented policies that brought surges of foreign
direct investment, foreign technology, and mechanization to Brazil. The nation's
economy grew at an astounding rate - for several years at the highest rate in the world -
but increased industrialization only increased the gap between the rich and the poor, and
failed to provide the long-term employment and domestic investment required for
sustainable advancement. Brazil has a stable economy again, and ready for another
period of rapid growth. However, future economic growth for the long-term will be
dependent on aiding sectors that have been left behind in previous decades. What is
needed is a set of policies that addresses the inequality within regions, poverty in the rural
and urban environment, vast income inequality, and sustainable rural development.
Combined with renewed investment in domestic innovation, community-based solutions
can increase the returns on national investment in development. By working with
community partners in low-income areas, appropriate solutions can be introduced to an
environment of long-term support. A joint project between MIT, the Universidade de
Sio Paulo, and the Escola de Canuani in rural Tocantins, Brazil, serves as an example of
how partnerships between local and outside organizations can introduce organizational
and technical solutions adapted to local needs and constraints. In January 2005, this
interdisciplinary team worked in Brazil with community partners to introduce technology
at levels as different as evaporative cooling by pottery and a computer center to address
the challenges and ambitions of their everyday life. The technology case studies are not
to determine success but rather to discover what needs to be in place for their
implementation. A similar model of incorporating community input in program design
and execution could be used in national development plans with greater effect than
previous methods.
Thesis Advisor: Amy B. Smith
Title: Instructor, MIT Edgerton Center
Policy Advisor: Alice N. Amsden
Title: Professor of Economy, Department of Urban Studies and Planning
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Maps
Figure 1. National map of Brazil. Source: US CIA, 1994.
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Introduction
Import substitution industrialization for expansion of the Brazilian economy will soon
reach its limits. Further economic growth is dependent on the nation's aid to sectors that
have been left behind in previous decades. The time has come to shift programs and
national funding for growth from the well-established industries on the coast to
underserved regions in the interior and low-income communities in the inner cities.
Instead of embarking on a new round of mechanization that increases the nation's
inequality and makes thousands more jobs obsolete, a new policy paradigm must be
found. By implementing a set of policies addressing inequality within regions, the
endemic problems of poverty in both rural areas and the urban slums, the infamous gap
between the Brazilian wealthy and poor, and the need for sustainable rural development,
Brazilian policymakers can bridge the national divide and strengthen the domestic
economy. Without also addressing the country's need for domestic innovation and a
stronger commitment to education, these policies alone will not be enough. Increased
access to information and education will increase the nation's overall competence,
qualifying many more people to work in new economy jobs or start their own successful
businesses.
It is possible to apply to many of these policies a framework known as participatory
development. In participatory development, the challenges of designing a process for
maximum impact, increased community buy-in, and long-term sustainability of
development projects are addressed. By opening lines of communication with intended
users, mapping user needs and suggestions, developing projects or programs in
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conjunction with the community, and integrating their feedback into their community and
similar projects in the future, development programs can better meet their objectives and
provide long-term solutions to underserved populations.
A group from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, along with the Universidade de
Sdo Paulo, and the Fundacgo Bradesco Escola de Canuani, demonstrates how outside
groups working with local community partners can successfully introduce new
technologies or organizations to solve everyday challenges. By bringing solutions from
around the world into a situation where they are analyzed by people from different
geographical and technical backgrounds, previously local solutions can be adapted to
meet the particular needs and constraints of communities facing similar needs. In the
communities near Escola de CanuanA, the various levels to which basic technology were
available determined the ambitions of the community. Based on their prioritization of the
most critical needs, our international team introduced and adapted concepts to meet
challenges in their daily lives. These adaptations become new local solutions, and are
added to the portfolio of community-designed appropriate technology. The technology
case studies are not to determine success but rather to discover what needs to be in place
for their implementation.
As a model for future policies, participatory development takes advantage of the existing
relationship between community leaders and government agencies. Instead of throwing
money at a problem and hoping it goes away, this is truly an opportunity to bring policies
in line with national goals and invest development money in projects that will have long-
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term successes. The last seven decades of industrialization have shown that it is time for
a new paradigm in Brazilian development policy, and this could be it.
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MIT's role in International Development
In recent years, the interest of MIT students in applying their engineering skills in
international and humanitarian settings has increased noticeably. New opportunities are
available each year to expose students to the life and challenges in different parts of the
world. Continuing relationships between MIT groups and partner communities all over
the world ensure beneficial interactions for both groups.
One of the ongoing MIT links to communities in the developing world is through D-Lab,
a class that helped make the work presented here possible. D-Lab is a year-long series of
courses on development, design, and dissemination, which can also include field work for
dedicated students. In the fall, students get a general background in international
development and appropriate technology. A variety of guest speakers, case studies and
labs demonstrate the challenges and rewards. In January 2005, D-Lab students then went
to communities in Brazil, Ghana, Honduras, India, Lesotho, Samoa, and Zambia to learn
about development efforts first-hand in their partner communities. Students had the
opportunity in their host country and upon return to MIT to reflect on how the culture,
language, economics, politics and history of their host country affected its development.
Most groups bring with them technologies developed at MIT or in other parts of the
world that could be useful in their partner community's environment.
The spring semester builds on the experiences of the fall and winter, but focuses on how
technology is developed for under-served communities. The partner communities that
host students in the winter typically work with students over the spring term, as well.
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Students who visited in January often bring back design challenges for people in future
classes or with a different set of skills. A project often takes more than one semester to
fully develop, and so the class runs in an iterative fashion where projects are at different
stages of the "pipeline" and may come back for several years as they are being perfected.
Participants learn not only about the needs of their partner communities and about the
different methodologies behind technology dissemination (e.g. mass-production and
small-scale shops), they learn about the constraints of economics, materials, environment,
education, and more, that make design for the developing world so challenging. As in the
fall term class, a perspective on the country's industries and history of development keeps
technology design in focus.
In January 2005, five MIT students examined the opportunities for technological
development in a variety of different communities in Brazil. The group visited several of
Rio's low-income communities known asfavelas, as well as Canuand, an indigenous
village on the river Java6s in the state of Tocantins, and rural family settlements, also in
the state of Tocantins. The visit was supported by local community leaders and our
community partners, the Fundac9o Bradesco, Escola de Canuand, and the Grupo de
Safide Rural. Students from MIT were joined by two students and a professor from the
Universidade de Sdo Paulo, who are interested in giving student in Brazilian universities
the experience of learning more about their home country, the opportunities for its future,
and the effects of its past.
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Brazilian Development Policy of the 1900s
The coffee oligarchy that ruled Brazil before 1930 placed a low value on
industrialization. Not until the bourgeois revolution of 1930 were the growing concerns
of development and the new middle class addressed by Brazilian politics. Since then,
desenvolvimentismo - or developmentalism - has been a key part of Brazilian national
policy, and is in large part responsible for the current state of the nation.
During that time, Brazil has undergone vast political swings, but the economic
development of the country has consistently been one of the primary driving forces.
Through the democratic government of the 1950s, and even through the dictatorial
regimes of the 1970s, left- and right-wing governments tried to prove themselves by
stimulating the economy of an oft struggling country. In the 1950s and early 1960s, the
leftist governments pushed nationalistic, protectionist, and interventionist policies. The
overthrow of the Goulart administration in 1964 marked the beginning of two decades of
military rule, where the economic development plan was characterized by large amounts
of foreign direct investment (Eakin, 1997).
Each era brought finance, new technologies, and even whole new industries, to Brazil.
Most were allocated to projects along the accessible coastline and its major cities. Rural
development programs have had limited success to date.
The Vargas Years (1930-1945)
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A military junta ousted President Washington Luis Pereira de Sousa in early 1930, after
he tried to elect a friend as successor in a fixed election. Out with Luis went the Old
Republic and the coffee barons that had ruled Brazil's politics and business for centuries
(Bieber, 1999). Thus began Brazil's aggressive industrialization of the twentieth century
under Getfilio Vargas, whose "colorless" campaign for the presidency painted proposals
for change that would lead the nation in a new direction. Vargas served as dictator,
congressionally elected president, and then dictator again, from 1930 to 1945 after
Though Vargas grew up in an old gaucho family, and was part of the leading oligarchy,
he had new ideas of how politics could support national development.
Vargas recognized the need to end the country's dependence on a single crop (Skidmore,
1999). Up until 1929, coffee was the primary export, accounting for up to 71% of the
country's foreign exchange (Maddison, 2004). By the early 1930s, Vargas' fears that the
economy needed to diversify from coffee were borne out. Worldwide demand dropped
during the Great Depression, and the price of coffee on the global market continued to
fall due to excess capacity (Hudson, 1998). By 1932, 60% of the value of Brazil's
exports had been lost (Henshall and Momsen, 1974). Investment in manufacturing to
replace now costly imports began to look more profitable to government policymakers
and to businessmen.
The push away from coffee resulted in the diversification of natural resource exploitation.
In order to encourage diversification, the state took a new role in economic intervention
and incorporated economic nationalism with industrial growth. Many of Brazil's state-
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owned enterprises developed from these early policies (Dickenson, 1978). A state-owned
iron and integrated steel mill complex, the first in South America, opened in Volta
Redonda (Eakin, 1997). The mill at Volta Redonda, in the north of Rio de Janeiro state,
processed ores from the newly opened mines just across the state border in Minas Gerais.
Much of that ore came from the newly formed Vale do Rio Doce Company, a state-
owned extraction company. Vale do Rio Doce was formed in an attempt to diversify the
nation's economy and provide much needed capital and jobs to the interior state. It
remained a nationalized company until 1997. In the North and Northeast, though, a slow
economic decline began as Brazil's sugar became less competitive on the international
market, and no other crop emerged to take its place. Foreign direct investment (FDI) also
became a key part of Brazil's growth between the two World Wars. FDI had been a part
of early utilities development, but money began to flow into the manufacturing sector as
well. Multinational companies like Ford, IBM, Siemens, and Firestone set up local
factories to serve already established markets. This financing only came to major coastal
cities, however, and was not a replacement for the declining agricultural industry in the
interior.
Vargas's vision of the new Brazil was made official in the Estado N6vo (New State),
continuing the policies he started after his first election. Under the Estado N6vo, though,
Vargas ruled as by decree, with complete control over legislative and judiciary powers.
His policies may have been in Brazil's best interests, but he was also quick to suppress
social and political opposition. The Vargas policies included (Hudson, 1998):
* A protectionist policy to put limits on import of foreign goods
19
* Some of the highest tariffs in the western hemisphere
* Easy credit and tax exemptions freely available to domestic manufacturers
* Wage controls and strike bans to limit the power of organized labor
* The curtailing of state rights in favor of regional groupings
* State-regulated "worker interest groups" (sindicatos) with less influence than past
unions, but greater membership diversity
* Fulfillment of a long-ago promise for workers' housing in Rio de Janeiro and Sgo
Paulo.
Combined, such economic policies kept domestic Brazilian manufacturers well-protected
from foreign competition. The result was a strong encouragement for domestic
production, and manufacturing flourished. The country's overall growth in GNP was a
respectable 4.6% annually, and new industrial growth accounted for over a third of that
growth. Strong protection against imports, like high tariffs, allowed traditional industries
to grow and new ones to form, especially around cement, iron, and steel. For example,
Brazil's cement production rose from 87,000 tons in 1930 to 745,000 tons in 1940
because of the high tariffs for imported cement products (Robock, 1975). The
protectionist policies were a mixed blessing, though, as they also contributed to the
growing inefficiency of business and higher prices for substandard domestically-
manufactured goods (Eakin, 1997).
By the end of the Vargas regime in 1945, there were noticeable changes in Brazil's
economy and industrial structure. There was a new upper crust in society: the most
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powerful families were no longer from the old colonial coffee plantations, but from the
recently surging immigrant businesses that grew up under Vargas's protectionist policies
(Eakin, 1997). Between 1890 and 1930, nearly five million immigrants arrived in Brazil,
primarily from Japan, Italy, and Germany; each group boasted entrepreneurs that changed
the Brazilian business scene. The Japanese came to work in the plantations, but quickly
came to own them, developing one of the largest farm cooperatives in Latin America.
Francisco Matarazzo epitomized the Italian entrepreneur. He reestablished the family
lard business in Brazil and went on to own United Industries, an empire responsible for
ships, railway cars, trucks, chemicals, distilling, metallurgy, salt and sugar refining, meat
packing, and insurance (Page, 1995). German immigrant Hans Stern came to Brazil to
escape the Holocaust, then founded one of the largest international jewelry businesses.
Germans were also instrumental in the establishment of Brazil's early breweries and its
first airlines, Varig and Vasp.
When these entrepreneurs arrived in Brazil, most of them had few assets to their name.
The country's policies during the birth of their businesses gave them the opportunity to
change its future. It is for progress like this that Vargas's legacy as the "father of the
poor, and the mother of the rich" plays to the memory of policies that went both ways.
Vargas alternately appeased the elite landowners and military stakeholders while
providing access and reforms intended for the growing urban and middle classes.
50 anos em 5: Juscelino Kubitschek (1956-1961)
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Domestic policy later swung away from the corporatism that marked the two decades of
Brazil under the ideals of Getfilio Vargas. The populist and nationalist economic
development policies of the 1950s and early 1960s changed the path the nation would
take, but not the ultimate goal. In 1956, more than one-third of Brazilians voted for
Juscelino Kubitschek over the emotionally charged populist party, the major opponent in
the election. Kubitschek became the only president post-Vargas to serve his full term
until this decade, in part due to his common appeal and the dedication with which he
pursued the nation's development (Maxwell, 2002).
Under the campaign promise of 50 anos em 5 - fifty years in five - Brazil's economy
continued to industrialize at an amazing rate. Once elected, Kubitschek put into plan a
Programa de Metas, or Target Plan. The Programa brought the state and private sector
together to accomplish his high-growth strategy (Skidmore, 1999). With five major areas
- energy, transport, food supply, basic industries, and technical education - the Programa
outlined the goals and responsibilities of infrastructural development needed to reduce
both technical and organizational bottlenecks in the modem society.
Among those goals was the creation of an automobile industry, based in Sdo Paulo.
Although there was no domestic automotive production or even production capability at
the beginning of the decade, new factories had made over 300,000 vehicles by 1960
(Hudson, 1998). As the automobile plants opened, an oil refinery opened in CubatAo,
also in the state of SAo Paulo, to serve their growing needs. It was soon joined by a steel
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mill, fertilizer, cement, and petrochemical plants, until twenty-five heavy industries were
operating in the small valley in Sao Paulo around Cubatto (Page, 1995).
The growing industry on the coast also served to open up the interior of Brazil. The
growing availability of automobiles, freight railroad, and mechanized equipment opened
the interior states of Mato Grosso and Goids to mass cultivation (Hudson, 1998). For
example, in the late 1950s, three-quarters of Brazil's farms used only human power in
cultivation. Once tractors were adopted in Rio Grande do Sul, they spread quickly
through Sdo Paulo, Minas Gerais and other states even further from the coasts. To
increase availability, a national manufacturing plan for tractors was established, they
became popular throughout Brazil's larger farms. A similar path of subsidized growth
increased the use of domestically manufactured fertilizers in agricultural centers
(Henshall and Momsen, 1974). Beyond all these programs, one major project began to
attract people into the interior: the beginnings of a new Brazilian city far from all the
coastal metropolises.
Projects like these openly challenged the colonial Portuguese tendency not to stray too far
from the coast. Kubitschek's administration used both organizational and engineering
feats as an attraction to the interior, still rural and largely unindustrialized. Hydroelectric
plants opened across Brazil, harnessing power available only in the interior, and
attracting power-hungry industries. Highway projects connected the coastline to Brazil's
minor cities, criss-crossing miles and miles of empty land with 13,000 kilometers of new
highway (Catalio, 2002).
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Accessibility did not immediately bring development to the interior, and "pull" policies
were also employed to try to lure industry away from the already prosperous coastline.
The new Superintendgncia para o Desenvolvimento do Nordeste encouraged investment,
and in particular industrialization, in the Northeast. Tax-forgiveness was a major
component in the plans of the SUDENE, though land reform was not (Skidmore, 1999).
Other new public bodies - like SUDAM and SUFRONTE, the superintendents for the
development of the Amazon, and Southwestern Frontier, respectively - were also created
to bring investment and employment to other underdeveloped Brazilian regions. Their
missions included leading literacy and health drives and the study of agrarian and land
use regulation. Under Kubitschek, the government finally had the administrative
capacity that it lacked under Vargas to meet the needs of a newly industrializing society
(Lafer, 1970). For example, SUDENE's first development plan called for the
establishment of a steelworks, a synthetic rubber factory, and a textile industry. The first
two were delayed. The Northeast's textile industry was modernized to increase capacity
and worker safety. New machines increased productivity and revolutionized the shop
floor. Breaks on capital expenditures established new enterprises in the market and
allowed other major players to grow.
These agencies were supposed to serve the development interests of the region; but the
focus on industrialization, bordering on exploitation, put community trust in jeopardy.
The modernization of the textile industry cost 20,000 jobs (Dickenson, 1978). The
policies ended up being effective in attracting new industry and in diversifying goods, but
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did not generate additional economic opportunity for the rural poor they were supposed
to serve. Corruption of public development agencies in past eras violated community
trust and reduced their positive effect on the target communities.
Administrative scandals occurred regularly - the Indian Protective Service, or Serviqo de
Protefdio aos indios, degenerated in these years under scandals of massive corruption,
landgrabbing, labor exploitation, and human rights abuses, resulting from the dereliction
or collusion of SPI agents. A 1968 government enquiry led by Attorney General Jader
Figueirido exposed evidence of unfair pricing of land and wood, deliberate tuberculosis
infection, agency resistance to and inappropriate demarcation of Indian lands (which
covered only 10% of Indian lands by 1967, and now includes 12% of the national
territory), and the forced removal of communities from Indian lands to make way for
ranching, which ultimately led to the deaths of up to one-third of the transplanted Indians
(Garfield, 2000). Although initiated to discredit the populist policies of earlier
administrations, every allegation was confirmed by fact-finding missions from other
groups like the International Red Cross. As a result, of the 700 SPI employees, 134 were
charged with federal crimes, an additional 33 were fired from their positions in the
agency, and 17 more were suspended (Garfield, 1999). The remainder were realigned
with other groups to form the present Indian affairs agency, FUNAI. Between 1900 and
the time the report was published in 1968, the million-strong indigenous population of
Brazil had been halved (Ribeiro, 1995).
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Perhaps more than any of the other Metas, Kubitschek will be remembered for fulfilling
his campaign promise to relocate the nation's capital. The idea of a central capital that
could unify the surrounding regions had been a part of the Brazilian destiny since the
1800s. Its creation was specified in the 1891 constitution, and a site was selected as early
as 1893 (Skidmore, 1999). Located in Goiis - 630 miles from Rio de Janeiro and 700
miles from Sao Paulo - the site for Brasilia became the new Distrito Federal upon its
1960 inauguration. Brasilia started as a planned and ultra-organized city, intending to
represent the egalitarian and modernistic Brazil. The city layout was supposed to make it
possible for all of the country's previously segregated social classes to live and work
together (Meade, 2003). It very quickly overgrew even the most optimistic plans of the
city designers, introducing both chaos and capital to the once uninhabited plains (Eakin,
1997).
By the early 1960s, many of the industrial targets had been met, and change was evident
across the nation. During the previous decade, electric capacity had doubled, paved road
length had tripled, steel production had nearly doubled, the cement industry had become
self-sufficient, and the automobile industry flourished - turning out cars as fast as
factories in more industrially advanced nations and using 90% Brazilian-made
components(Henshall and Momsen, 1974). Still, growth had not been even throughout
the country. Despite government efforts to attract manufacturing and other industrial
sectors to poorer parts of the country, most growth took place along the coast. The
already existing regional differences in firm and workforce concentration were
exacerbated by the rapid economic growth under Kubitschek (Table 1 and Figure 3).
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Region
North
Northeast
Periphery
Heartland
Rimland
1920 1 1940 ( 1950 ( 1960 1969
Firms I Workers Firms I Workers Firms I Workers Firms I Workers I Firms I Workers
Percentages
1.86 1.41 1.93 1.57 1.44 1.22 1.59 1.00 2.44 1.20
17.03 18.69 13.69 17.03 17.53 15.69 15.63 11.00 17.26 9.04
14.69 11.11 15.97 11.82 16.21 12.55 16.77 14.06 18.47 14.00
52.11 57.58 52.75 59.82 56.70 60.69 48.75 64.72 44.52 66.68
14.39 11.19 15.66 9.75 18.11 9.85 17.26 9.21 17.31 9.07
Table 1. Regional distribution of manufacturing establishments and workers in Brazil, 1920 - 1969.
Adapted from Henshall and Momsen, 1974.
Figure 3. Regional divisions used in Table 1. Source: Henshall and Momsen, 1974.
Countering the shift of workers from the rural to urban areas, the less developed regions
also showed higher than average economic growth rate over a similar period (Table 2).
Unfortunately, much of this economic growth was a result of new capital-intensive firms.
These new businesses eliminated jobs in the region, but brought a net gain in revenue.
People put out of jobs in small businesses ended up moving to the rapidly growing cities,
hoping for a better outcome.
27
National Pop./ Percentage Distribution Per Capita Income
area (%) km 2 Population Total Income % National Average
Region 1950 1960 1970 1949 1959 1970 1949 1959 1970
North 42.0 1.01 3.6 3.7 3.9 1.7 2.0 2.0 47 54 51
Northeast 18.2 18.23 34.6 31.6 30.2 14.1 14.0 12.2 41 44 40
Southeast 10.9 43.38 43.4 43.8 42.8 66.5 64.1 64.5 153 146 151
South 6.8 29.35 15.1 16.7 17.7 15.9 17.5 17.5 105 105 99
Central West 22.1 2.70 3.3 4.2 5.4 1.8 2.4 3.8 54 57 70
Table 2. Economic growth in rural areas was rapid through the mid-twentieth century. Adapted
from Robock, 1975.
The growth of informal settlements in urban areas - including Sio Paulo, Rio de Janeiro,
Recife, and the new Brasilia - were a result of the poor land distribution policies in
interior agricultural or ranching states leading to the migration of displaced workers. The
rural poor went from being rural wage earners and sharecroppers to being an itinerant
labor force (Page, 1995). Many of them gave up and moved to the cities, where their
actual earning potential was much lower than they imagined. Over the 1950s, 1960s, and
1970s, 20 million rural poor moved to Brazil's urban centers - the largest migration ever
of its sort (Hudson, 1998). Those that stayed on in the country and tried to claim land
were ignored by the government, which created conflict when the lands were sold en
masse to mechanized agricultural corporations or ranchers. The migration to the cities
continued despite attempts to develop the Amazon and to limit the size of the largest
cities in favor of strengthening mid-sized cities.
The ambitious development during the Kubitschek era was not without environmental
consequences or social costs either. In Cubatio and near other newly industrialized
areas, informal worker settlements sprang up near the heavy industrial facilities. The
cities clouded over with smog, and the air and water filled with pollution. People were
getting sick from industrialization in Brazil at the same time that the environment began
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to emerge on the agenda of European countries and the United States. Similarly, the
highways built across sensitive ecologies against the warnings of government scientists
demonstrated the nation's prioritization of industry and society. Many of those ecologies
also encountered complications from the changed hydrological cycle as a consequence of
bringing hydroelectric power to the interior.
Worse, the poor were still poor. Though many people had moved to the cities hoping for
better job opportunities and economic conditions, their situations did not improve. In
1960, 40% of national income was distributed among the top 10% of the population, 36%
in the next 30% of the population, and 24% among the poorest 60% of Brazilians
(Hudson, 1998). Half of those in the poorest category lived on rural farms, where they
still practiced traditional subsistence agriculture. The other half were those who had
come from a background of subsistence agriculture and then found themselves in the
cities and unemployed.
Brazil may not have quite made up 50 anos em 5, but the advance in industry and
economy was undeniable - and it would turn out to be costly. Domestic savings were
kept low, domestic investment was low, and the foreign capital attracted to Brazil was not
sufficient to maintain the high rate of growth (Skidmore, 1999). As a consequence of
Kubitschek's economic policies, an era of inflation and economic instability began in the
early 1960s. Unable to bring the nation's fiscal situation under control, Kubitschek's
successor, JoAo Goulart, was overthrown in 1964. Even under the military rule that
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lasted until 1985, the country earlier known as the "sleeping giant" took giant steps into
the future.
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The Brazilian Miracle (1969-1973)
In the government's September 1970 Metas e bases para a aqao de governs (Targets and
Foundations for Government Action), General Emilio Garrastazu M6dici laid out the
steps Brazil had to take to make this last big step into the developed world. He
proclaimed that the March 1964 revolution had created "the basic conditions for true
development, democracy, and sovereignty," when Brazil most needed "above all, a
government without commitments to the interests of any group, class, sector, or region"
(Skidmore, 1988).
The earlier policies of import-substitution industrialization, particularly of consumer
durable goods, paved the way for rapid expansion and modernization of Brazil's
industries in the late 1960s to early 1970s. On a quest to legitimize the new military
regime to critics both inside and outside Brazil, M6dici and chief economist Finance
Minister Ant6nio Delfim Neto sought to return the nation to its upward growing path.
Industrialization under the Kubitschek administration (1956-61) had emphasized the
growth in capacity and market for consumer durables. After the economic foundations of
the 50 anos em 5 collapsed in 1962, demand dropped sharply. The quickest way for the
new military government to re-energize the economy was to stimulate demand for these
products and reactivate idle capacity. As a side effect to this stabilization, the purchasing
power of an already relatively affluent part of society was increased (Skidmore, 1988).
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The policies that drove the economy forward in the early years of military rule sought to
make better use of the increased capacity and mechanization achieved during the
previous surge of growth. The consumer durables industry was again called into action
in the sixties. Credit restrictions were eased so the growing middle-class could purchase
durable goods like automobiles and refrigerators, increasing domestic sales of goods. As
demand went up, so did productive capacity, and the size of the workforce, and therefore
the demand, creating a cycle that strengthened the economy on macro-scales but actually
decreased real income for the lower classes and increased the wage gap (Table 3) (Page,
1995).
Income Groups Relative Income Levels
(Percentile: (Percent of Total Income)
Lowest Income
Group to
Highest
1960 1970 1980 1995
1-10 1.9 1.2 1.1 1.1
11-20 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.2
21-30 3.0 3.0 3.0 2.4
31-40 4.4 3.8 3.5 3.2
41-50 6.1 5.0 4.5 4.2
51-60 7.5 6.2 5.5 5.3
61-70 9.0 7.2 7.2 7.2
71-80 11.3 10.0 9.6 10.1
81-90 15.2 15.1 15.3 16.1
91-100 39.6 46.5 48.3 48.2
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Bottom 50% 17.4 15.0 14.1 13.1
Top 5% 28.3 34.1 37.9 34.6
Top 1% 11.9 14.7 16.9 13.9
Table 3. Income distribution in Brazil, 1960-1995. Notice that the percent of total income for all
income group percentiles but the richest decile declined between 1960 and 1970. Adapted from
Eakin, 1997.
Brazil's sought to stabilize the economy yet again, but without the tough monetary and
fiscal policies prescribed by the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The government
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hoped to draw back private investment by reduced inflation in conjunction with new
economic policies favorable to producers. With authoritarian power to speed the process,
the Generals acted quickly on a somewhat orthodox and very gradual return to growth.
Under the Campos-Bulh6es plan first introduced in July 1964, Brazil began enacting
"transitional" measures to reduce inflation. Key economists cited three main sources of
inflation: public sector deficits, excessive credit to the private sector, and excessive wage
increases (Skidmore, 1988). The three main components of the policy were the
immediate reduced expenditure by government to cut the public sector deficit, indexation
of fixed assets, overdue tax bills, and a new type of government bond; and a wage policy
that closely tied unions to federal control. None of these would have been possible
without the presence of an authoritarian regime, which created a central bank from
nothing in 1965 and persuasively enforced its fiscal policies by eliminating other
alternatives.
Their traditional approach to debt in developing countries rejected, the IMF expressed
"great skepticism about the 'gradualist' approach to the problem of inflation" (Gordon,
1964). But by 1969, Brazil's was the fastest growing national economy in the world,
with an annual GDP growth rate of 11%. Inflation had returned to 17%, from several
hundred percent a few years earlier (Skidmore, 1988). Subsequently, foreign direct
investment returned by the millions.
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An economic success story like this may be known as a miracle, but this became known
as the Brazilian Miracle. From 1969 until 1973, Brazil maintained the highest economic
growth rate in the world through an environment favorable to producers, with policies
that included:
· Suppression of worker wage demands - for example, workers' wages were
capped so that even with the reduced inflation rate, their real income was
depressed
* Powerless unions, even in the face of increased pressure for productivity and the
consequent increase in industrial accident rates
* High rates of foreign and domestic private investment - invited not only by
increasing exports but also through increased extraction and processing of natural
resources.
By 1973, Brazil was exporting USD$10 billion, up from less than USD$3 billion in 1968
(Page, 1995). Much of the growth was related to the increase in production and
manufacturing-oriented businesses (IBGE, 1986). State-owned enterprises were among
the fastest growers.
The capital goods sector hugely benefited. Brazilian industry leaders used to have to buy
machines and other capital equipment overseas. During the late sixties, the domestic
capacity for production equipment grew solidly. Foreign businesses also played a big
part in the new developments - foreign direct investment contributed heavily to basic
industry, development of the infrastructure, and production of military hardware
(Skidmore, 1988). Despite the military administration's claims of nationalism and
34
autonomy, their new growth model relied almost completely on the influx of foreign
capital to maintain itself. The major weakness lay in turning over control of the nation's
money and knowledge centers to foreigners in exchange for their new military hardware
and increased budget.
Productive growth was still focused on the economy as a whole, and therefore
disproportionately emphasized development of the major coastal cities. As the available
productive capacity filled up, policymakers turned to the interior for additional growth
opportunities. In the Northeast - still impoverished from the collapsed sugar economy
and recent years of bad drought - huge tax write-offs did lead new companies into the
region. Most of them, though, were still capital-intensive rather than labor-intensive. As
in the fifties, the new Northeastern urban industries were actually destroying jobs rather
than creating them (Skidmore, 1988). In particular, Recife, capital of Pernambuco state,
was flooded both with investors looking to produce a quick mechanized buck and the
rural poor - looking for jobs that were not there.
The northern states, like Amazonia, fell victim to similar fates even when development
was done specifically in cooperation with regional planners such as the Fundo de
Investimento da Amaz6nia (Fund for Investment in the Amazon, or FINAM). A wide
range of new technical equipment was brought into the region, but few positions were
created. Those that did appear were not suited for those people who needed them the
most (Cliisener-Godt and Sachs, 1995). Highly technical jobs did not match the low
average education in the region, and qualified technicians were loath to leave better jobs
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in the cities. The jobs most needed in the region were unskilled positions requiring only
a limited education and no special knowledge. Instead of creating them, the highly
mechanized processes reduced job opportunities. This was true even in job fields that
used to employ many uneducated Brazilians, including ranching and agriculture.
After the failure of new job creation in the Northeast, General M6dici sought to incite
rural-rural migration. Following the idea of the Bel6m-Brasilia Highway that connected
the new capital to the northern coast, M6dici initiated the Transamaz6nia Highway.
Starting in Jodo Pessoa, Paraiba, at the northeastern tip of Brazil's coast, the
Transamaz6nia Highway would run from the Atlantic all the way through the Amazon to
the state of Acre and eventually the Peruvian border. Construction would create new jobs
moving farther and farther inland, with the hopes of creating migration from the
Northeast. In particular, movement was expected from the most impoverished states of
Pernambuco and Bahia. The final destinations on the Programa de Integra(Oo Nacional
(National Integration Plan, PIN) were supposed to be new villages along the highway.
The villages would be located in the states of Rond6nia, Mato Grosso, and Acre. But
once the highway was finished in a region, so was the village. Deserted settlements were
left all along the highway as the interior was populated and then again abandoned. Those
who did stay found themselves on the dead-end path of subsistence farming. Major
landholders already owned much of the surrounding land, and had taken advantage of the
favorable investment climate to mechanize their farms. Already low-paying jobs had
now been rendered obsolete, and entry into commercial agriculture was near impossible
because of the concentrated ownership of land.
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Many of the people who started out on the highway did not even continue westward -
they diverted south to answer the "pull" of SAo Paulo state (Meade, 2003), which was
still experiencing incredible growth that every unemployed country man thought could be
his next big leap. What was supposed to be the solution to two of Brazil's problems -
"men without land in the Northeast and land without men in Amazonia," in General
Mdici's words (Skidmore, 1988) - solved neither and turned into an ecological disaster.
Migrant workers in the roadside settlements laid claim to land, then deliberately cut and
burned the forests. Failing to grow crops, they ceded the land to cattle ranchers, who
burned down more of the forest. In other areas, the highway allowed the introduction of
environmentally exploitative industries like paper mills and mining, which polluted the
waterways.
The government's so-called "Pharaonic Projects" created during the Brazilian Miracle -
that is, projects fit for a Pharaoh - left behind more of a legacy than their creators may
have wanted. Highway and industry projects in the Amazon basin created significant
ecological damage, frequently epitomized by deforestation and indigenous rights
violations. As can be imagined, the new electricity plants brought with them similar
consequences. They made industrialized business and middle-class living possible in
rural Brazil. But they also wiped out huge amounts of land. Along with the land went
the trees, animals, and peoples living on it (Cliisener-Godt and Sachs, 1995). Each major
energy project - like the Tucurui reservoir and the Itaipii hydroelectric plant - displaced
at least 20,000 people from some 250,000 hectares of land (Survival International, 1987).
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Problems in indigenous relations related to human rights abuse, landgrabbing, mining,
and disruptions to tribal lands and migrations arose frequently, and were dealt with by the
military under a heavy hand. A second miracle under these conditions was the resilience
of the inter-relationship of sociodiversity and biodiversity under such adverse conditions.
It is conceivable that another round of growth like that seen in the early seventies could
be the end to many of Brazil's native cultures and species. Throughout the 1900s, almost
100 of Brazil's 510 distinct indigenous groups disappeared (Cliisener-Godt and Sachs,
1995). The cultural extinction was a result of assimilation as well as the extinction of a
lifestyle. Major development projects like highways and hydroelectric plants as well as
industrial projects like mining and agricultural expansion also divide land. Previous
travel routes of nomadic tribes, hunting grounds, and spiritual places have been at risk.
The regional plant and animal species that are a part of indigenous life in Brazil are also
on the decline - fish are poisoned from upstream extraction of ores, trees are removed for
agricultural expansion and lumber trafficking, and animal habitat is shrinking. With their
lifestyle in the interior decimated, many people have headed for better fortune.
Those northerners who fled the side effects of rural development often found themselves
in worse situations in the cities. Informal housing settlements, known asfavelas, were
springing up around the nation's cities to accommodate the poor who had recently landed
there. In a sense, many of the infrastructural and planning problems of Brazil's modem
cities are consequences of bad rural land planning that has now shifted to bad urban
planning.
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Despite the country's improvement in overall economic position, and the increased
affluence of the upper and middle classes, the Brazilian Miracle was not so beneficial for
the poor. The decrease in real income exacerbated the national inequalities of wealth
(Table 3) at the same time as fewer rights - both labor and human - were available to the
common Brazilian. One cause of the increased poverty levels was the growing
concentration of people moving into the urban areas, looking for new jobs. At this point
in history, Brazil had truly transformed from a rural state to an urban one. In 1950, even
before the leadership of Juscelino Kubitschek, 64% of the population was rural, and 36%
lived in urban areas. By 1980, the proportions had already reversed to 33% rural and
67% urban. Brazilians in this era had more to worry about than their wages though - the
military regime was and still is infamous for its repression, torture, and death squads.
Though their economic policies fostered amazing industrial growth, the human
developmental conditions remained at a low. What the military policies overlooked was
that long-term technology development cannot take place without human development,
and human development is not possible without basic human rights, many of which were
not available to Brazilians between 1964 and 1985.
A whirlwind of development between 1969 and 1973 brought the nation to a dizzying
pinnacle, one that obviously could not last long. Over that short time frame, there was
three-fold growth in exports, and unprecedented industrial growth in fields as diverse as
basic industry, infrastructure, and military hardware. The Slo Paulo auto industry and
the materials associated with their domestic supply chain are a good example of national
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industry growth in the Brazilian Miracle. Steel production went from 2.8 million tons in
1964 to 9.2 million tons in 1976. This allowed automobile production to rise from
184,000 vehicles to 986,000 vehicles in the same period (Dickenson, 1978).
The 1973 oil crisis marked the beginning of the end for the Brazilian Miracle, and so
many other economic dreams of the early seventies. At that time, Brazil was importing
80% of its oil, and was hit hard by the oil shortages and rising costs. In contrast, it now
produces half of its own oil, and has proven reserves that could last over a decade at
current consumption rates (EIU, 2004).
The bubble burst in 1973, and ended under huge foreign debt, inflation, a recession,
increased income disparity, and the fear that Brazil would never truly make a success of
itself (Meade, 2003). A weak attempt to continue development from 1974 through 1985
focused on the import substitution of basic inputs and capital goods, along with expanded
exports of manufactured goods (Hudson, 1998). Mid-seventies growth was still highly
dependent on international borrowing, international aid, and investments from foreign
multi-national firms. These sources of capital also dried up as foreign investors worked
to recover from the energy crisis on their "home fronts." It seemed nothing could bring
the nation back on track.
Out of the disruption brought on by the economic collapse came more confusion. Rapid
inflation led the military to increase the presence of civilians in the government until
ceding to democracy in 1985 as the economy tumbled out of control. None of the early
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democratic governments could restore inflation to normal rates, either. President
Fernando Affonso Collor de Mello tried, and failed, with the radical approach of
confiscating all of the population's savings, before his administration was torn apart by
exposure of corruption that surprised even Brazilians (Meade, 2003). Cocaine use,
embezzlement, kickbacks, and political favors for large corporations were among the
indictments leading to Collor's 1992 impeachment. Accusations of corruption in the
state government of Paraiba even led to one governor shooting his predecessor (Page,
1995). Violence was increasingly common in Brazilian daily life. Particularly in the
favelas, waves of random massacres and drug-related executions stunned the nation and
scared city-dwellers. Until the late nineteen nineties, economic and social chaos, rather
than development, prevailed.
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Partner Communities
One of the greatest challenges to Brazil's development is the great diversity in
communities and people that also makes it a beautiful country. The variations in culture,
climate, and population density complicate development efforts because few
organizational structures or technologies meet the specifications of all the deserving
groups across the country. Profiled here are two different types of community in the rural
state of Tocantins and thefavelas, (informal low-income settlements) of Rio de Janeiro,
as well as the opportunities for technology policy development in them. The first step to
working with the Brazilians to understand and express their future opportunities is
understanding the constraints and resources of their local reality.
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Community: Aldeia Canuana
Brazil is a large country with great variety in culture, climate, environment, and needs.
Even rural areas vary greatly from the forested regions in Amazonas to the desertified
Northeast states like Pernambuco to the pantanal (a sort of wetland) and cerrado
(savannah) regions. Tocantins is mostly pantanal and cerrado, with its borders just
touching the forests and the desert regions to the north. The state of Tocantins was
officially established in the 1988 Constitution from the northern territories of the state of
Goids, launching a new autonomous region with the initiative of bringing foreign and
domestic investors to a modem, developed state. The following year, the capital city of
Palmas was founded. A purely planned city designed to meet the target population and
industry growth of the new state, it is Tocantins' major connection to the rest of Brazil
and the world (MRE, 2005).
Some five hours by car from Palmas is the Ilha do Bananal (Banana Island). Ilha do
Bananal is a fluvial island nested between the rivers Araguaia and Java6s. It is the
largest fluvial island in the world, at about the same size as the state of Massachusetts
(some 1800 hectares). Each year, up to two-thirds of the island is flooded throughout
the six month rainy season. The island is divided into two parts. The northern half,
known as the Parque Nacional do Araguaia (National Park of Araguaia) (IBAMA, 2005)
is an ecological sanctuary with rivers, lakes, woods, and wildlife. The southern half of
the island is the Parque Indigena do Araguaia, where around 1,700 Java6 and Karaji live
in small villages, each known in Brazilian Portuguese as an aldeia, like Canuana.
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The aldeia Canuand, also written Kanoano, has about 400 residents living in 70 family
groups. The people of Canuani are primarily indigenous Brazilians of the Java6 tribe.
Some people have come from other tribes, like the Karajd, Tuxi, Xerente, and Avd-
Canoeiro. About 70% of the people in Canuang are multilingual - speaking Portuguese
and at least one language of the Macro-Ge family, mostly Iny, but also Java6 and Karaja
(Survival International, 1987).
Like many traditional villages, Canuang is organized in rows along the river Java6s
(Figure 4). The most important families and buildings are built closest to the river, in a
straight line along the bank. In Canuand, the people who live closest to the river include
the cacique (political head of the village), the paje (spiritual head of the village),
teachers, and craftsmen and artisans. Along with these people and their families,
important civic organizations are located near the river. These include the escola taind
(school), a very small market, and the Canuang office of the Funda~c'o Nacional do
Indio, Brazil's national Indian affairs agency. Just beyond these is a low concrete
building with driedpalmeira leaf roof, painted inside with traditional designs. The
building serves as both the town meeting hall and sports court.
A second row of homes is built beyond the first, and so on, to five rows. In the back area
of the village are a palm grove where the dead are buried, space for livestock and crops,
and the casa dos homens. The casa dos homens (men's house) is a site for socialization
and ritual celebration - but only to be entered by men and boys over 11. Women are
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barely allowed within sight of the casa dos homens, and punishment for violating the
taboo is severe.
house
Rio Jlavs
I
Figure 4. Canuani is organized along the river Java6s in rows, with the most important people and
civic functions located nearest the river.
Despite its rural surroundings, Canuand has a surprisingly well-developed civil
infrastructure. Near the school there is one pay phone. The main street can be lit by
incandescent bulbs. No cars are in the village, but streets are wide and kept clear of
debris for pedestrian, bicycle, and horse traffic. Even in the traditionalpalmeira houses,
people live fairly well. Some homes have running (but untreated) water. A couple naked
incandescent lights in a home are not uncommon, and several families even have
televisions and a video game console. Most family groups have a small garden for
vegetables and cassava (manioca); chickens that run loose in the house, yard, and
surrounding village; and enough fishing equipment to provide for their family. Fruits
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grow everywhere, and are treated as communal property. There is no refrigerated food
storage anywhere in the village, so meats are either eaten freshly killed, left outside
unprepared, or salted to dry in the sun in the style of came do sol. Dogs and livestock
run unattended throughout the village, creating both hygiene and safety problems.
The living conditions in CanuanR are typical of the indigenous villages in the area. Other
villages nearby, like the aldeia SAo Jolo, have similar structure and facilities. One major
difference between these two villages, though, was the different importance of
hierarchical political structure. The social structure in Canuani is much more easy-going,
and its community leaders much more gregarious. This may be an effect of having a
different tribal composition, but it was clear from the infrastructure and village layout in
Sio Joio that this was not just related to who was in charge of the village at the moment.
The contrast may also be connected to Canuana's increased interaction with outside
culture through television and closer proximity to the nearest city of any size, Formoso
do Araguaia.
People in CanuanA no longer lack the basics for sustainable human existence. At this
point in the region's development, they have met their basic needs, but want more
connection with the world around them. The Ilha do Bananal has become part of
Tocantins' plans for regional ecotourism as well as increased agricultural output. To be a
part of this new economic growth, the people in Canuand are interested in things like
learning Spanish and English, interacting with their state government, and participating in
the food markets that could sell their crops and regional fruits to other parts of the
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country and the Mercosul group of countries. One of the constraints to the village's
development, however, is the need to ensure that the thriving traditional customs of the
Java6 people is not overwritten or forgotten as a new generation grows up with a greater
understanding and interest in outside practice. Care must be taken in all projects to
supplement, rather than undermine, the old ways.
Understanding the constraints of the region they live in and the desires of the people of
Canuana in the village's and region's growth is critical. Constructive development of
new opportunities within the village and the village's relationships to Tocantins and the
rest of Brazil are possible only with a clear view of the area's local history and ambition
for the future.
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Community: Assentamentos Caracol and Pirarucu
Much of the rural population of Brazil lives in groups even more remote than the village
of CanuanA. During the last decades, the national government's attempts at land
demarcation (Survival International, 1987) have made necessary the relocation of
families in many regions through the Instituto Nacional de Colonizaiio e Reforma
Agriria (National Plan for Colonization and Agrarian Reform) (Ramos, 2005a). In
Tocantins, the creation of the Indian reserve on Ilha do Bananal led to the "option" for
several hundred Brazilians to move off of the island in exchange for a plot of land. The
plots offered were in the middle of nowhere, even by Brazilian standards, but the
government promised to come through and connect them all by a paved road and to bring
the infrastructure together once people had established themselves.
Now, just across the river Java6s from the Ilha do Bananal, around 600 people live in 200
family assentamentos (settlements). Collectively, the groups are known as the
assentamentos Caracol and Pirarucu (meaning Snail and Pirarucu, a large fish exclusive
to the Amazon and other large rivers of northwest Brazil). The assentamentos Pirarucu
have 267 people in 74 families, and in the assentamentos Caracol there are an additional
124 families with 355 people. Each of these settlements is between 120 to 240 acres. A
typical settlement has three dwellings on it which are used as houses or storage. Most are
made of traditional dried palmeira leaves. Some are built of brick, with clay roof tiles or
corrugated tin roofing provided by national development initiatives. Centered between
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the houses is typically apalmeira-topped shack for food preparation and other outdoor
activities.
About seven to ten people live on each settlement as a group. It is not likely to be a
single "nuclear" family, but rather parents, their children, and an aunt/uncle family or
elders. When they get married, women typically move in with their husband's family,
and the family expands thusly. The multiple houses together allow some measure of
privacy between generations. An average settlement has 50 cows, and 50 square meters
of planned cultivation (being Brazil, most of the things eaten in rural areas grow
wherever they please).
The level of infrastructure in the assentamentos is noticeably lower than in the aldeia.
There is no running water, and no electricity, not even from car batteries, generators, or
other distributed sources of low capacity.
Hygiene and sanitation standards are generally low. Foods, including fruits and fish, are
left out between the time they are brought to the house and the time they are cooked.
Leftovers also sit out after being cooked, as do uncooked foods which have been partially
prepared. Waste, be it biodegradable foodstuff, plastic wrappings, or hazardous elements
like alkaline batteries and pesticides, are tossed onto the ground just outside the house.
There is no specific waste bin or collection pile in any of the settlements. Along with a
lack of running water, the households often do not have a designated toilet area either.
Children urinate on the house's dirt floor without correction, and animals freely defecate
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in the main rooms of the house. (This was not the case for older children and adults,
though. So although behavior patterns for young children and animals are different, they
are not scolded.)
Water is typically extracted from unlined, uncovered wells using a bucket on a pulley.
Distribution of water to the house, garden, and livestock is done by hand. A few of the
better-off families had more advanced systems that required less time and less physical
strain per liter of delivered water. One even had a gravity-fed pipe system to deliver
water from the well to a trough and to the house. The water is rarely treated or even
filtered, so water for any purpose - washing, cooking, or drinking - is highly turbid, the
opacity of skim milk with the color of a cafe com leite.
People living in the settlements also have less contact with outside culture than those
living in the villages like Canuani. The typical settlement does not have any electricity,
access to newspapers, or the means or reasons to go to the cities. A bus connects the
settlements - running once a day along the long, empty dirt road that connects them to
each other and to the nearest towns. Even the concepts that keep the region and the world
running - cash currencies and salaried jobs - are not the norm in the settlements. Wealth,
in many families, is still measured in cows, which are sold off as major purchases are
needed. Most of the families' time, and physical needs, are filled by life at home.
What connection the families do have to outside areas is mostly through the associagao
dos assentamentos, a loose-knit association of the settlements. The association manages
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relations between the settlements and the government organizations in Tocantins. The
president of the association lives in the only household with a telephone and any
electricity. At his settlement, meetings are held every month to update others in the
settlements about new government programs, who is going into the towns when, and
other local events.
The standard of living across the settlements represented by the association was quite
similar, though some differences in economic level and education were apparent (and, of
course, related). People with better water systems and better sanitation/hygiene tended to
have closer ties to the local technical high school in Canuana or had household members
who had spent some time living in the city and may even have gone to the university.
Perhaps owing to less access to results of increased development or to general
satisfaction with the way of life in the settlements, people have less motivation for
change and development in their region. Many dream of sending their children to school,
but ambitions of material possession or riches are not the standard in rural Tocantins.
Most adolescents dream of having a house and family, but lack the opportunities or
exposure to other ambitions and the means to make them reality. For those living in the
assentamentos, even meeting basic sanitation needs could make the difference in local
health and opportunities. Improved access to (clean) water would also be a great
improvement to the public's health and the likelihood that that region of Brazil could
remain populated.
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Even if people prefer life out in the country - and indeed, many of the people visited
indicated that they were happier out in the settlements starting from scratch than living on
the island - improvement in basic human needs will assure better health and growth in
the settlements and the region.
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Community: Thefavelas of Rio de Janeiro
Many of the people who live in Brazil's informal housing communities like those in Rio
de Janeiro began life in rural states like Tocantins and came to the city looking for
improved economic conditions and a better life. The rapid influx of Brazil's poorest led
to the growth of large low-income communities in all its cities, lacking infrastructure and
opportunity.
This migration has been happening in Brazil since the end of the nineteenth century.
Rio's firstfavela, at Morro da Providencia, was founded in 1897 by former slaves
escaping the Northeast sugar plantations after abolition. Migration has continued to the
point where 80% of Brazil's population is urban. Now 4% of the national population or
approximately 6 million people live in the nation'sfavelas or comunidades (Lazarte,
2004).
Within the state of Rio de Janeiro, at least 1.8 million people - or one-third the state's
population - live in one of Rio's five hundredfavelas (Figure 5). This is up from just
around 1 million in the 1991 census (de Queiroz Ribeiro and Correa do Lago, 2001). This
and other census data is widely acknowledged to underestimate the size of these
communities. Regardless of the source, though, the overall trend still shows that the
favela population is growing at a faster annual rate (about 7.5%) than the state's overall
population (2.5%).
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the region by area, a high population density allows nearly two million people to live in these
neighborhoods. Adapted from Prefeitura do Rio, 2005.
As the favelas grew, and the jobs and economic growth sought by newcomers failed to
develop, the neighborhoods came to be associated with drugs, violence, poverty, and poor
living conditions with inadequate water and sanitation. The contrast between life in the
favelas and the neighboring bairros (districts, neighborhoods) is evident, and nowhere
more so than in Rio de Janeiro. Thefavelas there are built into the hillsides and
mountains, overlooking and intertwined with some of the wealthiest and most exclusive
properties in the world.
Pressure from overlapping communities and the continued internal social unrest
eventually led to the creation of programs intended to "urbanize" thefavelas, home to
nearly two million cariocas, as people from the state of Rio de Janeiro are known. The
largest program, Favela-Bairro (from slum to neighborhood), is a "tool to promote urban
and social integration of cariocas and reverse the process of urban decline" (Prefeitura do
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Rio, 2005) by bringing basic infrastructure and municipal and social services to the
favelas.
What started as a temporary solution for the working poor in a new region of the country
has become a large part of the city's housing policy. As the communities have urbanized,
the wordfavela has come to be a misnomer for many of them. Some, like Rocinha, are
now known as comunidades (communities). Comunidade reflects the permanence, inter-
relatedness, and growth of what is no longer "just" a low-income neighborhood.
Rocinha
The neighborhood of Rocinha is a good example of how afavela has become a
comunidade. Rocinha is undoubtedly the largest low-income community in Brazil, and
many say in South America, with a population between 127,000 and 500,000 (Lazarte,
2004). Through the favela-bairro project, it has also become one of the most developed,
and in 1992 was elevated to bairro (district, neighborhood) status.
Rocinha now operates more like a "city within a city," with its own public transportation,
local TV channel, schools, and civil services. Despite being a "low-income community,"
the lifestyle of many of Rocinha's residents is familiar to people living in other parts of
Rio and even here in the United States. A 2003 survey by the Rocinha TV channel found
that of a few thousand respondents, 56% shop at the local shopping mall, 23% have a
credit card, and 93% have at least one television in their home (Canal Comunitirio da
Rocinha TV, 2004). The development of Rocinha has also changed the class structure of
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the neighborhood - about one of five residents now has a job in a "middle class" social
occupation, such as routine worker, technician, or teacher (de Queiroz Ribeiro and Correa
do Lago, 2001).
The change to bairro has given recognition to the hard work of community leaders in
Rocinha and from the Prefeitura do Rio, but there is still work to be done. Rocinha now
has the distinction among the 32 peer administrative regions of having by far the lowest
education and average income levels because of their previously existing bairro status
and wealthier population (Juca, 2004). This represents both opportunity for improvement
relative to peer communities and the challenge of getting appropriate aid to continue the
comunidade's growth as a new political entity.
Santa Marta
Most of the comunidades in Rio still have not yet made as much progress in partnership
with urbanization projects like Favela-Bairro before they will have benefited as much as
Rocinha has. For example, Santa Marta is a densely populatedfavela in the Botafogo
municipality. As Rio's favelas go, it is rather small, with a population between 7500
(Attivarci, 2002) and 10,000 (Lazarte, 2004) residents. Most of the families in Santa
Marta originally came to the neighborhood in the 1930s and 1960s, from the south of the
state Minas Gerais. Despite the age of the community (around 75 years now), the current
residents, as normal in thefavelas, are very young. 44% of the population of Santa Marta
is between 10 and 29 years of age (Attivarci, 2002).
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Santa Marta is an example of the challenges that must be overcome for infrastructural
development in thefavelas. Like many otherfavelas in Rio, it is built into the side of a
hill, and presents the challenge of verticalization. The upward growth separates the
neighborhood economically. In Santa Marta, the poorest people live at the top of the hill
- contrary to planning in other areas - where despite the great view that normally drives
real estate prices at high elevations they must also climb to the top of the hill. Residences
at higher elevation in vertical slums also tend to have fewer utilities than those at the
bottom, where connections (legal or not) are easier to make. Verticalization is always a
hazard, but especially when the poorest and worst quality buildings are towards the top of
the hill. There is always the threat of ground breaking free from the hill, sending
buildings collapsing down the side onto lower levels.
Working with residents to reinforce upper-level buildings and protect people from areas
where building- and land-slides have recently happened are major aspects to the civil
works going on in Santa Marta.
As a side effect of the vertical alignment of the neighborhood, transportation is very
difficult. Cars are not allowed or physically able to enter Santa Marta, where the main
thoroughfare is a narrow and makeshift stairway. Though the first stairs are concrete, the
materials change as one ascends the hill into the less affluent parts of the neighborhood.
Higher level stairs are made of scrap wood, cinder blocks, sandbags, and other irregular
materials. The consequences are apparent. Business opportunities are limited by the cost
and difficulty of shipments. Open sewage systems, which form a river that runs through
the hill from the very top to the very bottom, overflow during rain. The overflow creates
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a cascade of sewage, refuse, and other unsanitary waste that runs all the way down the
neighborhood and spills out into the streets below the hill.
More so than in Rocinha, the urban threat of drug-trafficking still plays a role in
community life in Santa Marta. Fewer than one in ten people in the community is active
in the drug trade (TOrres Barbosa, 2005), but the business affects everyone in the
neighborhood. Some streets are unsafe to photograph or even walk on because they are
gang territory. The effectiveness of police is hindered in all types of enforcement and
community relations because people are afraid to use them as a resource when their
business could be mistaken for snitching. The future of the community's younger
generation, which often has limited exposure to realistic views of life outside thefavela,
is always in jeopardy as life in the trade is romanticized by drug runners in the
neighborhood and the "high life" is exaggerated on the television and other media that
they do have access to.
At the same time, Santa Marta is also home to some spectacular projects whose objective
is to strengthen the community from within. These efforts, which include everything
from day care centers to neighborhood photography seminars, are being started by both
residents and outsiders, and bringing attention to the needs offavela residents in Santa
Marta and other parts of Rio de Janeiro and Brazil.
Mangueira de Botafogo
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Across the neighborhood of Botafogo from Santa Marta is thefavela Mangueira de
Botafogo, which extends from the foot of Morro da Saudade (Hill of Sorrow) up into the
hills, connecting to other favelas on Morro dos Cabritos. It is also a smallfavela, of
around 12,000 residents (Massa de Campos, 2005). It looks more like a regular
neighborhood than many otherfavelas because of its paved streets, single family homes,
and relatively low population density. Like manyfavela communities, it is unofficially
unrecognized. For example, it will not turn up on a map. It can be located only by
finding the big green spots which label the hills (morros) the neighborhoods are named
for (like the Morro Dona Marta of Santa Marta). Representation in the city council or
other legislative bodies is almost unheard of. Legal deeds to land on the hillsides are
uncommon. Legitimate connections to city services and utilities are equally rare. Here,
as in other lower-income parts of the city, connection to local utilities is made by splitting
off legal subscriptions or the mainline into hundreds of little connections. In Brazilian
Portuguese, this is known asfazer urnm gato, or to make like a cat, by digging claws into
the utility pipeline (Figure 6).
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illegal connection to main lines or one legitimate subscriber.
These informal (and illegal) connections are made for water, electricity, telephone, cable
television, and even internet. Despite its prevalence, the trend has gone "unnoticed" by
government officials and utility companies. Even the governor's palace, Palicio de
Laranjeiras, serves as a main utility connection to the neighborhood.
Because of its relative structural and social stability, people are choosing to stay in
Mangueira de Botafogo even as their education and income level rise. Ties of this
strength are important to the ongoing improvement of the community's living conditions
and introduction of new municipal services to the area.
Long-term community development
Despite their differences in size, one thing these communities all lack is the internal
social network or motivation necessary to get improvement or development projects up
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Figure 6. Favela homes anc Fndo um gato, or making an
and running. There are great examples of successful projects in each neighborhood, but
the pervasive attitude that there is not enough time or that someone else will take care of
the community's problems is much more prevalent. Neither is access to technology the
issue here. The use of technology for growth and creation is, though, an uncommon
ambition. Technology is used almost exclusively for passive interactions, like television
and video games, rather than authorship or active learning. The types of technology that
people living infavelas invest in reflect basic needs, like refrigeration and air
conditioning, followed by entertainment, like televisions and game consoles.
The challenge of fostering social networks in thefavelas can be related directly to the
demographics. In a typicalfavela, over half of the residents are less than twenty years
old (Figure 7). Only one of five will continue school past the seventh grade (Figure 8).
In order to make ends meet, people often work multiple jobs, odd jobs, or a combination
of a regular job and informal employment. This leaves few people with the ambition or
time necessary to give back to the local community on a voluntary basis.
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Figure 7. The population living in these low-income communities tend to be concentrated in the age
range below 20 years old. Adapted from Lazarte, 2004.
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There is room for hope, however. People who live in thefavelas tend to stay in the
neighborhood for a long time (Lazarte, 2004). Long-time residents are a foundation for
building the strong connections necessary for consistent community improvement. An
increasing number offavela-residents economically moving into the ranks of Brazil's
middle class may also help. Middle-class residents commit to only one job and have
income beyond the minimum which they can dedicate to their children, community, and
future. They also have increased interest in the safety of their neighborhood as their
family grows, and will have to help the community if they intend to stay in it, as they
have shown likely to do.
Fostering long-term development of thefavelas into comunidades will become even more
important over the next few years. After stagnant growth in the 1970s and 1980s, the
1990s and 2000s have again brought rapid increased growth to Rio'sfavelas. The urban
sprawl has made it harder for people to buy their own homes on the outskirts of the city,
and the price of land has gone up at the same time the purchasing power of workers has
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decreased (de Queiroz Ribeiro and Correa do Lago, 2001). Neighborhood growth now
comes from within the city itself, rather than from the rural states as in the past.
This year was MIT's first experience working with communities in Rio'sfavelas. With
community partner CIESPI - the Brazilian non-governmental organization Centro
Internacional de Estudos e Pesquisas sobre a Infdncia, known in English as the
International Center for Research and Policy on Childhood - this winter of 2005 was
spent learning about present reality and the role technology should play and how it could
be introduced.
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Community partners
Spending many years and millions of dollars is not necessary to reach the conclusion that
meaningful technical and economic development in small communities is challenging.
What a community partner can do is make an already ambitious goal achievable. They
provide an exclusive perspective on the community and its living conditions that shapes
design from the very onset of the project. When outside groups leave, they can then be
responsible for keeping the project alive in the long-term. Their value derives from their
knowledge and commitment to making their society a better place to live.
Community partners are people or organizations that already work within the community
and serve as local contacts for outside agencies. They provide first-hand knowledge to
learn about the community, the challenge being solved, and the constraints that have to be
worked within. They provide local expertise in culture, environment, finances,
organizational style, and other aspects that can affect project design and success. Their
established presence in the partner community facilitates the participation of new groups.
If the community partner is trusted by the people around them, it can ease the
introduction of new members and new organizations from outside and created within the
society. Without their support, getting access to and confidence from people can be
difficult.
Even beyond initial meetings, the community partners play a strong role. One of the
biggest challenges in international development projects is defining the realistic
sustainability of a project and perpetuating it. Projects that fizzle out after the originating
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group leaves are not helpful to anyone, and community partners can help prevent that
from happening. As stakeholders in the project, they have an interest in seeing it
continue. If there are recurring costs in staffing or equipment, or additional upkeep, they
need to be a part of the planning on ensuring that such situations can be prepared for and
overcome.
In the case of the projects presented here, they would never have gone so well or even
happened at all without the participation of a few really good community partners. They
each played a different role which together made way for successful interactions.
The projects described here were made possible by partnership with the Fundaaio
Bradesco, the Escola de Canuani, the Grupo de Safide Rural, the association of
assentamentos, and the leaders of the aldeia CanuanA.
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Fundagio Bradesco
In 1956, Amador Aguiar, founder of Bradesco, now the largest private bank in Brazil,
started an organization to provide education and professionalization to young children,
youth, and adults across the Brazil (Fundaaio Bradesco, 2005a). The Fundamdo Bradesco
opened its first school in 1962 in Slo Paulo, and has been working on this goal ever
since.
The FundamAo now serves 107,000 students in 40 schools across the country (Valente,
2005), and has recently opened 26 computer centers with the same social mission. There
is at least one school in each of Brazil's 26 states, and one in the Distrito Federal. The
Fundagao's Escola de Canuani is one of the five working farms and one of the two
boarding schools in the system. The organization's budget comes from the endowment
set up by Aguiar at its founding, and the yearly expenses of running the schools comes to
about R$148 million (US$53 million) each year (Valente, 2005).
Expressly created to support low-income families in Brazil's strapped and too-small
public school system, the schools educate a diverse range of Brazilians from the urban
favelas to the indigenous settlements. The driving motto behind them has always been
educar e transformar vidas e abrir caminhos
To educate is to transform lives and open paths.
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Behind the philosophy lies an entire way of teaching that unites education with quality of
life. The three fundamentals to the Fundagao's teaching methodology (Fundaiao
Bradesco, 2005b) are the
· Continuing education of teachers: By facilitating teacher interaction with other
institutions, academia, and the community, teachers are expected to increase their
technical and pedagogical competence and use newfound knowledge in classroom
experiences.
* Democratization of the school: The Fundagio provides open discussion spaces
within the schools, with the express intent of giving students and teachers the
freedom to talk about whatever will help them in their quest for knowledge.
* Active citizenship: There is hope and support that students will participate in
creativity, leadership, and development to their full potential through extra-
curricular activities. Being an active citizen includes taking action in the school, a
microcosm of larger society.
Each school serves as a social reference point for its region. The successes of its students
exemplify for the surrounding communities the possibilities to expand horizons and to
realize dreams.
Escola de Canuani
In each area that a school is opened, the Fundagao becomes an active part of the
community. The school in Canuana opened over three decades ago, and is now an
indispensable partner in local activities. Its size and geographical integration with the
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communities its students grew up in ensure strong relations based on a practical
education.
The Escola de Canuana is one of only a few working farms and boarding schools in the
Fundag9o system. As such, it's also one of the largest schools, with a total land area of
about 25 km2 and 72,400 m2 of built space including dormitories, classrooms,
administrative areas, and recreational facilities. The school has some 921 students for the
2004-2005 school year, including 20 preschoolers/kindergarteners, 640 elementary
through middle-school students, and 261 high school students (Funda9ao Bradesco,
2005c).
Students at the Escola de Canuana come from all over the state, but mostly from the
communities nearby. Many of the students, though, come from the aldeia Canuani on
the Ilha do Bananal, just across the river Java6s from the northern boundary of the school,
and from the assentamentos - settlement lands that form the school's other boundaries.
(Funda9Ao Bradesco, 2005d). Those from further away come from the larger cities in the
state, like Gurupi, or Formoso do Araguaia - at 60 kilometers away, the nearest city to
the school.
Along with the close relationships built by living at school, the working farm
environment provides each student with practical knowledge of rural life. Those who
want to understand the social and public health conditions of the area better have the
opportunity to do so through extra-curricular activities run by the school's teachers.
68
O Grupo de Saide Rural
One of the activities created to bring the students at Escola de Canuand face-to-face with
the challenges of development in rural Tocantins is the Grupo de Saide Rural (Rural
Health Group, commonly known as the GSR). Started in 2001 by Dr. Cicero Ramos, the
GSR brings together the students from the Col6gio Dr. Dante Pazzanese and the people
of rural Tocantins to teach of fundamental hygiene and basic preventative medicine. The
GSR was a great community partner, without whom the field work in the aldeia Canuani
and in the assentamentos could never have been so successful.
Since its inception, the school has held regular "health days" where community members
came in to the school for activities, check-ups for kids, and other services. From that
grew the GSR, which takes students from the school and into the settlements. The
"health days" transformation into the GSR was guided by the United Nations
Development Programme's Millennium Development Goals (UNDP, 2004).:
1. Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger
2. Provide basic universal education to all
3. Promote equality between genders and autonomy of women
4. Reduce infant mortality
5. Improve maternal health
6. Combat HIV/AIDS, malaria, and other diseases
7. Preserve environmental sustainability
8. Establish a worldwide partnership for development
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Under these guidelines, the founders of the GSR developed education on preventative
practices in the area of health and well-being of the settlement communities. For them,
the overall idea was that health and well-being are necessary to and an incentive for self-
actualization of the community (Ramos, 2005a). With improved health, the people of
assentamentos Caracol and Pirarucu would be better able to participate in citizenship and
solidarity with the school and neighboring communities. As the school doctor, Cicero
Ramos put it, this process was "indispensdvelpara qualquer sociedade socialmente
responsdvel " (Ramos, 2005b) - a necessary and indispensable part of any socially
responsible society.
The program has begun to make a noticeable effect on living conditions in the
settlements. For the students, it is valuable to see that their actions had an impact on life
in the settlements, but also in their school and on themselves. The internal development
and active participation in citizenship is exactly what the Fundagio has hoped to promote
through its teaching philosophy (Fundagdo Bradesco, 2005b).
GSR activities have been successful in part because of the school's strong relationship
with the neighboring community - with joint activities, and many of the students coming
from the area - but also because they have been approaching the challenge
systematically. Rather than focus on specific illnesses, the GSR has taken a broader
approach to treat causes, rather than symptoms. Therefore their activities emphasize
improving the living conditions that cause high rates of preventable disease, a continual
challenge to the community in the present day. Broad steps that are taken in GSR
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activities (Ramos, 2005a) include the development and teaching of preventative practices,
the incentivization of sustainable self-actualizing development within and by the
community, and the strengthening of the feeling of citizenship.
One of the first major activities of the GSR in 2001 was to undertake a questionnaire to
determine the living conditions and demographics of the area. By traveling through the
settlements themselves, the students gained the trust of people around the community,
saw the challenges of daily life first-hand, and got more detailed and reliable census
results than even the state of Tocantins's agency on rural development. The survey
aimed to find out not only who was living in the assentamentos and in what conditions,
but what was missing, and what the residents felt they needed in their lives. This kind of
information helped the GSR as they chose their next actions.
Since that first survey, a variety of initiatives have been started by the GSR in response to
the stated needs of the settlement dwellers. Those that are still going on include (Ramos,
2005b):
* Health education: General education about basic hygiene and preventative
medicine. Includes cleaning and boiling water, brushing teeth, sanitation
guidelines, etc.
* Vaccination campaigns: GSR students accompany school doctors or outside
programs from the state government to encourage people to participate. They
also entertain children during treatment to make their vaccination experience a
little less "dolorido" [hurtful]
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* Check-ups: Again with the doctor from the Escola de Canuani, the GSR educates
people in the settlements about and encourages them to participate in basic health
check-ups. Basic check-ups can include height/weight, vision, blood pressure,
and other quick, low-cost measurements that can indicate problems or general
well-being.
* Encourage participation: Brazil and Tocantins have been very active as
governments and with other agencies in getting health programs, censuses, voting,
and other citizen activities to rural areas. Without the support of a local
community connection, though, getting people to participate can be difficult. The
GSR serves as a trusted connection between visitors trying to do something
beneficial and the people in the assentamentos who do not know who they are or
what they want.
In total, there are now thirty students in the GSR. There are many more students who
want to participate, but as always time and resources are lacking. Each student who
applies must be in US equivalent of grade 5 or higher, and writes a full application and
sits an interview with the faculty advisor to the GSR, Dr. Cicero Ramos, and then with a
group of students already working with the GSR. Eleven of these students worked with
MIT and USP on our visits to the settlements. Their presence was invaluable, and
demonstrated how necessary a good community partner is to successful local
development work. They not only understood the settlements, Tocantins, and Brazil, but
eased communication and trust between families who had probably never left the state
and people who had come from halfway up the world.
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Community leaders of aldeia Canuana
As in the settlements, the support of local leaders was necessary for projects taking place
in the aldeia Canuand. The different leadership positions in the aldeia include the
cacique and his vice-cacique, the paj6, and the anci6es. The cacique was the most
involved in the daily activities while MIT/USP was in Canuani. However, all of them
were aware of the projects and gave their support and solidarity towards those efforts.
Each one's specific role in the community determined their role as a community partner.
The cacique is a political leader and the contact for the government's Indian affairs
agency, the Fundagiio Nacional do Indio (FUNAI). There is also a vice-cacique.
Responsibilities of the cacique include running village meetings, assisting in dispute
resolution, and maintaining good relationships with other villages and other levels of
government, like the FUNAI and the Instituto de Desenvolvimento Rural do Estado do
Tocantins (rural development division of the government of the state of Tocantins). The
current cacique is easy-going, and maintains his political support by riding around the
village and nearby areas on his bicycle. Especially as the computer center was being set
up, he dropped by frequently to watch the progress, chat with officials from the school,
and sometimes even to lend a hand. Until the mid- 1 900s, it was a hereditary position, but
now each cacique serves for six years. His successor is chosen by the council of elders.
Known as the ancioes, the council of elders is responsible for far more than choosing the
cacique. Choosing the cacique is only one of the many actions that they take in their
charge to pass on traditional culture and values. The challenge is at least doubled by the
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coexistence of several indigenous groups in the one village, all of whom have
overlapping, but distinct, beliefs, practices, and traditions. They serve beside the cacique
during village meetings, and participate in special ceremonies like those performed at
relating to the grand opening of the Centro de Inclusao Digital.
While the ancioes take charge of passing on tradition, they are also guided by the paj6.
The paje is the spiritual leader of the village. He can make contact with spirits for
harvest, health, and other purposes, and also guards the knowledge of traditional herbal
cures. At the opening of the computer center, he was there to give his blessings and
welcome the spirits with positive energy to the new space.
Connecting with the aldeia's leaders, and the traditions that they follow, made the work
in Canuani official and acceptable to the people in the village. These connections were
necessary to inspire trust in outsiders, gain first-hand knowledge from the community,
and to ensure the continued success of the "seeds" of ideas being planted within.
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Associagio dos assentamentos: The settlement association
Even with the support and participation of the GSR and the Escola de Canuani, a partner
within the community was important to getting access to people and gaining their
confidence. Since there is really no such thing as a "local government" at the level of the
settlements, connections were made instead through the "offices" of the loose association
of the settlements Caracol and Pirarucu. Though the organization has no official status
outside of the settlements, the association is locally recognized as a gatekeeper to the
community and a centralized way to distribute information.
The centralization is a result of the minimal structure of the settlement association. It is
run by one person who is elected from all the settlement dwellers. The same man has
been "president" of the association for several years now, owing to his ability to make
connections, the smiling personality that puts people at ease, and the technology (the only
phone in the region) that helps him stay in contact with people in "far away" cities like
Formoso do Araguaia, Gurupi, and Palmas. He manages to get information about local
market prices, new government programs that might bring money into the region, and
deliveries of goods and services, into an area with fewer than 4 people living in each
square kilometer (Ramos, 2005a).
Even though the association is loosely organized, his cooperation is important for getting
access and support from people living in the settlements. This group had a much less
active role in the MIT activities than the GSR did, but instead "paved the way" politically
for everything that happened. The association was told about the MIT visit in advance,
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so there was sufficient time for word to spread by the occasional bus that travels through
the settlements, bringing people to the city and back. Upon arrival in the settlements, the
president of the association was the first person visited. It was not so much that he was
needed to give an official perspective about their needs and lives. Rather, visiting him
first was an act of respect, which allowed him to pass final judgment on what would
happen in the community.
Some projects that were started in the settlements require additional education or material
distribution after the departure of the MIT/USP team. Further developments will be
coordinated between the settlement association and the GSR. Their continued support
will ensure that no action is left half done.
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The Next Brazilian Development Policy
Brazil's industrialization policies since the 1930s have failed to generate employment on
a large scale, increased income inequality, and left behind a significant portion of the
population. Now in a good financial position after nearly two decades of chaos, it is time
for a shift in domestic policy paradigm. The development programs of Brazil's past
subscribed to the premise, then prevalent in nations all over the world, that industrial
growth was the means to the end - the way for under-developed countries to generate
employment for the increasing number of people who were underemployed and for the
unemployed rural poor.
So far, Brazil has gone through three major growths in industry. Each time, its overall
economic and industrial stance improved through technical industrialization, but the
"wholehearted embrace of modern Western technology," with no consideration of
alternate technologies, left behind exactly those people who industrialization was
supposed to help (Dickenson, 1978). Attempts to establish Western technology in the
interior have often followed a continued coastal desire for control, perceived import-
export advantages from environmental exploitation, and the establishment of a Brazilian
presence to preempt boundary disputes with neighboring rebel factions. The mid-
twentieth century emphasis on the Amazon, for example, arose during a time when the
administration feared that if the Brazilian Amazon basin were not developed soon, the
region would be lost to subversive elements of neighboring countries (Clisener-Godt and
Sachs, 1995).
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Policymakers are now in the position to recognize technical, personnel, and institutional
limits, and use those to upgrade development performance rather than designing the
perfect plan. In the late 1990s and early 2000s, the domestic economic stability has
increased substantially and the preconditions for growth are present again (Robock,
1975). The GDP has been growing steadily the last few years, reaching USD$582 billion
last year (EIU, 2004). There is also now the administrative and financial capacity to
reform policies for national development. Key policies will be necessary to obtain future
growth. The economic conditions that will make policy reform possible include (Kanitz,
1995):
· Relatively low international interest rates
* Low levels of corporate debt - as corporations prepare for another cycle of
growth and new debt
* Return to profitability - as above, institutions of all sorts have recovered from the
financial chaos of past years and from the previous capacity expansion
* Increased inflows of foreign capital via bank loans and equity markets
* Improved management and manufacturing quality compared with prior growth
phases
Under these conditions, Brazil can undertake domestic policy that will finally address the
inequalities within its regions, the community or "micro" level approach to poverty
reduction, the national problem of income inequality, and the challenge of sustainable
rural development.
Regional focus: The inequalities within regions
78
Regional planning has been a significant part of Brazil's development plan since the late
1950s. As a result, though, the already developed areas in both richer and poorer regions
received almost all of the capital and knowledge going into state or regional development
programs (Queiroz Guimardes, 2004). Now it is time to shift to an intra-regional focus
rather than regional policy. A shift towards policies for the under-developed parts of
each region will be the first to resolve the inequality within states where opportunity and
poverty do not fall along state borders. Bringing technology, economic opportunity, and
leadership to poorer regions will improve income in Brazil's underdeveloped regions,
creating new markets for products and services produced elsewhere in Brazil. For
politicians, the growth of new businesses will increase tax revenues in previously
impoverished areas.
Tocantins, like many other states in Brazil, has taken steps themselves to create an
agency that focuses on state development in the rural areas, outside of the more
prosperous capital city. A similar policy on a national scale would benefit areas
underdeveloped by national standards, as well as the more prosperous. Focusing growth
policy on underdeveloped regions would create an environment where it would no longer
be favorable to wait for cues from the government to decide on the direction of business
or technical research. Because of the tendency for volatility in regulations and economic
structure, Brazilian corporations have used government cues on the country's next steps
to determine their business plan and research paths for decades. This system has hindered
innovation as firms wait for those cues before embarking on new plans (OECD, 2001).
Shifting the government focus to underdeveloped regions will reduce cues to big firms.
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Corporations will have to will diversify the directions chosen within industries stimulate
domestic inventiveness.
Effective policies in addressing regional inequality will require, among other things,
greater cooperation and liaison between development agencies working across the nation
and in the same region on different programs. Resources will have to be distributed in a
more equitable way than they have been in development attempts to date (Dickenson,
1978). Increased equity in resource allocation is necessary to
* Stabilize the flow of resources for research in regions, through the normal
congress-approved budget
* Clearly identify counterpart projects in other regions to negotiate transfer of skills,
technology, personnel, and funding between government agencies and other
organizations
* Make an effective effort on the part of the national development agencies to
recover, maintain, and widen their links with national and regional institutions
dedicated to the production of knowledge.
The cooperation of policymakers, particularly in Brazil's development agencies, will
increase project productivity without adding significant burdens to project expenses.
The "micro" approach to poverty reduction
Brazil has been trying the "macro" approach to solutions in poverty - that is, industrial
growth as the means to employment and development - with limited success. Clearly, it
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is time to try the "micro" approach and invest substantially in community level
initiatives. This has the advantage of addressing the typical challenges faced in
development programs: weak local buy-in, lack of time, and lack of money. By focusing
government-sponsored development initiatives on local communities, increased
community participation can be sought. Working with a particular community, rather
than imposing "development" on them, improves local buy-in and improves the chances
that the program or technology will be useful after contact with the originating agency
has ended. In the end, it may not save time or money, but will instead increase the
returns on the time and money already committed to development.
What the "macro" approaches fail to recognize is the way change works within
communities. Working with small groups can encourage individual changes. When
those are particularly effective in a community, they can foster transformation of nearby
groups and eventually of the whole social structure (Mariz, 1994). One example of this
in Latin America is the Taller la Corea workshop in on old working class neighborhood
of Havana, Cuba. Sponsored in part by government development agencies, people who
participated in the taller started with one block of homes as a model for neighboring
blocks. They learned how to improve sanitation by improving sinks and bathrooms,
added other components like structural roofs and basic electricity, and made aesthetic
improvements that made people proud of the work they had done. When the one block
was finished, people were quite proud of their work, and showed it off to people in
surrounding blocks. Over the last ten years, housing improvements have spread over an
area about ten blocks on a side. New jobs have been created, new community centers
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have started, and the pattern is still spreading. The benefit to a program with a "micro"
focus is that in stressing the standpoint of the poor themselves, goals can be set with a
limited, immediate, and specific impact on lives. Additionally, the theme of the program
can be largely transferred to other areas, because it is not entirely dependent on the
structural elements of the whole society. Past programs in Brazil have emphasized
sectional and regional development through public bodies (IBGE, 1999). The
participation of local community partners will be introduced to new government planning
for poverty reduction.
In many parts of Brazil, the government infrastructure is already in place to take this kind
of approach. Even in the most rural parts of Tocantins, for example, there are offices of
and agents of the state and national governments. So the expertise, community
relationship, and funding are already in place. Their application to community-focused
development programs would be locally beneficial in the short-term, with quantifiable
returns, and nationally beneficial in the long-term, by increasing the state of development
in heretofore neglected regions.
There exists a wide variety of challenges that could be addressed by the "micro"
approach to poverty reduction. For individual, small programs as recommended, it is
important that the parent agency ensure:
· Stakeholder involvement, in terms of both ownership and participation
· The availability and transparency of resources and time
· Institutional credibility and capacity for change
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* The relationship to national policy: basic political, social, and cultural rights are
necessary for sustainable human development. Human rights are not given in
addition to development, they are required (Smillie, 2000).
Alongside the organizational or technical solutions to communities facing poverty, it is
necessary for Brazil to directly address its infamous income inequalities and
un(der)employment. The current macroeconomic stability is needed for continued
industrial growth and for poverty reduction. The connection lies in the tendency for
capital to flow in as economic activity accelerates, increasing wages, real income, and
thereby reducing poverty (The World Bank, 2004). A successful set of combined
policies on these two issues would go a long way towards increasing the country's
capacity for future growth into the knowledge-dependent world economy.
Income distribution
Brazil has advanced rapidly in the last century in technological terms, but the inequalities
in wealth that were a part of its colonial days have only grown, becoming a part of the
country's international reputation. Exacerbated by over-mechanization, where
industrialization turned a nation that used to import slaves by the millions for manual
labor to one where labor was on the verge of becoming obsolete (Viotti da Costa, 2000
and Ribeiro, 1995). In the past, Brazilian industrialization policies assumed that income
distribution and poverty could be divorced from growth and added on to the national plan
when convenient. Even with the fastest growing economy, the gap between the rich and
poor intensified throughout the twentieth century. This was particularly true in the rural
interior and in dense urban settlements. The increased gap over the Vargas, Kubitschek,
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and Mbdici years goes to show that to truly advance, Brazil will need to deal with the
human as well as mechanical factors of development (Smillie, 2000). Further challenges
to equality were imposed by the macroeconomic volatility of the intervening decades.
Macroeconomic volatility has adverse effects on income distribution and poverty
indicators (The World Bank, 2004). For example, it tends to cause high turnover in
employment, interrupt educations, and destabilize the business environment. As a result,
the income of wage-earners in the formal sector is reduced, the earning potential of new
wage-earners is limited, and the overall opportunity for employment is reduced. The
common factor among policies that would reduce inequalities in wealth is that they tend
to be opposite to those policies formulated to attract foreign direct investment in the last
century. Some aspects to a unified policy paradigm aimed at decreasing the income gap
in Brazil might include:
* Reduced barriers to entry into formal business - administrative overhead in
business start-up in Brazil is very high, as are the costs of taxes and land for new
commercial ventures. A focus on small businesses would require a way to make
entering business accessible for less wealthy and less educated people.
* Programs targeted for small business development in under-developed states or
regions - similar to the objectives above, but with additional incentives for people
in rural areas or for those who would move to rural areas to start new businesses.
* An emphasis on employment in the interior that creates jobs requiring simple
production methods and local production materials for local consumption
(Smillie, 2004). The survival and creation of simple production units is not a far-
out fantasy. Brazil is still industrializing, and in all regions of the country and
84
many fields of production, commodities can still be processed for local use in an
economically feasible way (Dickenson, 1978).
* Support for the small, nascent movement of people from jobless cities to
franchising in smaller towns further from the coast - this is one way that people
start businesses in the interior right now - by developing one franchise and using
the profits from that to start their own business (Kanitz, 1995).
* A new programa de metas that emphasizes five new areas for change - the new
target plan will reflect the country's need to grow small and medium enterprises
(SMEs) as well as economic opportunities in rural areas and underdeveloped
urban areas.
* The generation of qualified human resources all over the nation - increased
production needs increased management and local research capacity. Renewed
commitments to public education, universities, and improved communications
structures increases formal and informal training in professional interactions.
Local community and business initiatives for income inequality have a history in Brazil,
and they have even better prospects for the future. Even in the 1800s, there were
attempts at small-scale economic opportunity development in Minas Gerais. The town
council and matriz (mother church of the parish) joined efforts to create long-term
positions and programs on public health and education, urban planning, transportation,
and communication (Bieber, 1999). Unfortunately, the towns had varying levels of
success relative to their connection to the state legislature. The established political
relationships between government agencies and many small villages in different states
will give a leg-up to enough communities that "cells" can be started from which ideas can
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spread. One modem showcase for local initiatives is the Foro Social Mundial (World
Social Forum). Hosted at the same time as the World Economic Forum in Davos,
Switzerland, the Foro brings together innovative companies and non-governmental
organizations from all over Brazil (and now, the world) to showcase their local
development programs. Establishing continued national support and funding for these
initiatives would make them possible all over the country at a level that has never before
been attempted.
Sustainable rural development
Like many industrializing and industrialized countries, Brazil now faces the challenge of
having to find ways to continue growing without adversely affecting the opportunities for
future generations. From thirty years ago, when its ministers openly said that Brazil
could be the importer of pollution, to the present day in which Brazil has ratified the
Kyoto Protocol, Brazil has had to do an abrupt about-face on its objectives of
environmental policy (Embassy of Brazil, Ottawa, 2004). The country's abundant natural
inheritance makes it especially important for careful consideration to be given to the path
by which the country chooses to strengthen its rural areas. Sustainable rural development
policies may include:
* Developing and supporting farmers' cooperatives and food processing -
Supporting the small farmer's struggle against the large, tenured landholder will
create employment, diversify crops, and strengthen the agricultural market. In
some states, small settlements cannot profitably sell surplus crops because of the
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high overhead that would be required for one small farm to go into business.
Working together would enable them to compete with larger producers.
Alternatively, the development of food processing industries creates a "value-
adding," knowledge-based, process to the domestic product stream. This policy
would also have to address the long held political influence of major landowners.
If small cooperatives start out in markets that are less attractive to large-scale
farming - for example, specialty regional fruits or those that are more conducive
to manual effort than mechanical harvesting - they could grow without being
direct competition to established markets held by tenured landholders.
Encouraging environment-based employment - Reversing the environmental
degradation affected during the last hundred years would be a challenge in any
society. One way to make it easier is to facilitate the opening of employment
opportunities associated with the natural economy. In Tocantins, this has been
done to some extent with ecotourism in the thermal springs in the south of the
state and on the Ilha do Bananal in the west. Some small businesses have been
started in the Amazon to collect and dry or make preserves from native fruits,
many of which are not available even in other parts of Brazil.
* Emphasizing poverty alleviation - the environmental ruin of rural areas is a
consequence of their relatively impoverished financial state and consequently
minimal political influence compared to other parts of Brazil. For a long time, it
has been more profitable to extract natural resources from the naturally wealthy
parts of Brazil, which also happen to be the financially poorest. Sustainable
growth can be encouraged by either supporting the rural poor in developing small-
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scale productive occupations or providing them with more (still unsettled) land
for local agricultural production. The former is preferable, as it increases the
nation's overall economic strength and will lead to improvements in other social
factors like education. If increased demand for labor does not precipitate in rural
regions, though, people will need more space to provide for themselves
sustainably (The World Bank, 2004).
Actively enforcing a policy to reclaim deforested or mined areas - although Brazil
is a vast country, abandoned quarries and burned forest can be turned into
profitable centers for different industries. The creation of incentives for
companies responsible for degradation to repopulate and repurpose land that has
been semi-permanently altered by their presence has worked in other big
industries with significant environmental impact like cement production (Lafarge,
2003).
The next step: Specific actions for policy options
No single policy will resolve these challenges, but a new policy paradigm that focuses on
regional inequalities, community poverty, income inequality, sustainable rural
development could be the key to Brazil's next big growth phase. Each of these four
strategies, coupled with policy directions to guide them, can be accomplished by
undertaking specific actions at the government levels or creating policies that will affect
the way other sectors work. The biggest challenge is initializing specific actions that
match political will and financial resources. In many cases, political will can be
increased by framing the policy in the ways that an action can be beneficial to politically
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influential regions of Brazil and to the nation as a whole. Capital can be redirected
through the rearrangement of existing programs so it covers similar objectives under a
new organizational structure. Both proven and innovative actions can be part of the
policy portfolio that makes this new Brazilian development policy a reality (Table 4).
Targeting these four specific objectives with specific domestic policy actions in
combination with a long-term approach for increasing the application and development of
knowledge will put Brazil on the fast track for economic growth in the early twenty-first
century. It will also help the country to earn and appropriately channel the funds used for
internal development. Results can be determined by the quantitative increase on returns:
number of jobs generated, number of businesses started, improvements in standard of
living in underdeveloped region, even increased GDP. Even in a few years under a
cohesive new development policy, Brazil could see improvements in these four strategies
that are not being met by many current programs.
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Examples: How policies can fail to meet community needs
Misguided development ideas are endemic not only to Brazil's past, but also to the
present. They affect rural areas and the inner cities; the community, the firm, and the
individual. While there are examples of positive effects of development programs in
many parts of Brazil, perhaps more can be learned from the attempts that have not ended
as planned. There are examples everywhere of how projects have turned out to be
incomplete, inappropriate, or underachieving. Many of these would have ended better
had there been increased community participation in the proposal or undertaking of the
project, resulting in direct ownership and responsibility for completion and continuity.
The following are examples from present day programs in Canuand village, the Caracol
and Pirarucu settlements, and thefavelas Rocinha, Santa Marta, and Mangueira de
Botafogo.
Incomplete projects
Incomplete projects tend to leave the community hanging and the relationship with the
development agency torn. In Brazil, it seems, incomplete projects start up and then trail
off rather than having any official closing or end. It may be a result of a decrease in
funding, change in national priorities, loss of personnel, or any of a variety of other
factors. In most cases, no one knows the exact reason because there is limited
communication between the agency responsible for the project's undertaking and the
community that it will affect.
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The original settlers of Caracol and Pirarucu under the Instituto Nacional de Colonizafdo
e Reforma Agriria (National Plan for Colonization and Agrarian Reform) encountered
one such project, never to be completed, right at the start. Encouraged, or persuaded, to
move from the Ilha do Bananal, families relocated to very empty lands on the other side
of the Javaes River. They were promised copious amounts of land, as well as a house,
clean water, livestock, and other benefits, in exchange for the inconvenience of moving
and in an attempt to develop subsistence or better occupations in internal Tocantins.
Once they had moved, and their old homes on the island were gone, people began to wait.
After waiting for the government to follow through on its other promises, many left the
area and moved to one of the nearby cities. Now, nearly a decade later, the people who
remain in the assentamentos have given up hope that there will be any follow-up on the
things that were supposed to get them started on the frontier. Those who have stayed
have built their own houses, dug their own (unlined, unfiltered, and untreated) wells, and
have just enough to get by. Many of the families visited by the team from MIT said that
they were happy now in the settlements, and would not move back to the island if given
the choice. Even so, it is hard to tell how different life could be if they had received
continued better support in their move across the river.
At some point, another agency decided that getting clean water to the Caracol settlements
would be a good project. A water storage tank and pipes were installed to extract water
from the ground, but the project fizzled and the actual pump was never installed. It is
unclear whether any more work will ever be done on it, though the rural development
agency does pass through occasionally and inspect the pump site. Despite their regular
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visits, no progress on installation has been forthcoming for several years now, and no one
has been alerted as to the status of the project. People still obtain their water from wells
dug themselves. The well is usually not lined, the water is not treated or filtered, and has
high turbidity.
Halfway across the country, in the low-income neighborhood of Rio de Janeiro known as
Santa Marta, another project goes uncompleted, but in a different way. The previous two
examples have simply not been finished. In Santa Marta, the project is being finished,
but its scope has taken an incomplete view of the conditions surrounding it. Santa Marta,
like many of Rio de Janeiro's low-income communities, is built vertically into the side of
a morro, or steep hill. Here, stairways are the most common means of transportation, and
the main thoroughfare from the bottom to the top of the hill is a stairway about two
meters wide (Figure 9). Going farther and farther up the hill, into less affluent parts of
the neighborhood, the stairs narrow and are made of consistently less stable materials.
From bottom to top, they go from cement, to wood, to sandbags, and even less structural
materials. The current project in Santa Marta replaces the steps that are wearing away
and those made of less stable materials with cement steps or ramps.
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Figure 9. The main "street" in Santa Marta is a set of stairs which narrows from the base, shown
here. The lowest steps on the hill are concrete. The sand bags on the right are being used to make
steps farther up the hill.
The renovation is coming along well so far, but fails to take into account one of the main
consequences of the verticalization of Rio's neighborhoods. During heavy rain, which is
frequent in the region, water from all over the hill runs down towards the bay. Any
refuse or human waste from the top of the hill is carried down the stairs where everyone
has to pass and down to the base of the hill. At the bottom, all of the water and the waste
it carries with it pours out into the surrounding neighborhoods. Beyond the sanitation
and flooding aspects, the rapid downhill flow also carries away individual steps and
makes many materials too slick for safe travel. The new stairs, unfortunately, have not
been built with consideration to improved drainage and sanitation. Stairs may be the best
way to get around in the verticalized neighborhood, but renovating them without
improving their basic structure indicates an incomplete understanding of the challenges
faced by the local community.
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Inappropriate projects
Other projects reach the objective of the development agency, but fail to meet the needs
of the local community. By conforming to metrics designed by the donor agency without
tailoring them to the needs of the recipient community, projects started with good
intentions can have minimal effects. Sometimes, proposed plans can even be detrimental
to the community.
One of the projects that has been clearly successful by its own metrics delivers building
materials to families in Canuani and the settlements surrounding it. They saw a need to
replace the traditional palmeira housing (Figure 10) with a more durable and more
permanent material. This region's need was probably defined by the heavy rains and
flooding that occur every year, which inevitably leaks into grass houses and destroys
some of them. The response was to send out bricks and clay roofing tiles. Some people
got assistance in building a house, but others built by themselves. Clay and brick houses
are way too hot for the region's year-round high temperatures. People find the temperate
livability ofpalmeira houses so much superior to the brick and clay that they will tolerate
the leaks during the rainy season. Many of these materials, therefore, still sit in piles on
otherwise unused land.
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aldeia Canuana. The dancers in front are part of a harvest celebration for the spirit Haruana.
Another delivery to Canuani that proved to be an ineffective expenditure on the part of
the state was the supply of two tractors to the aldeia. These new, full-size tractors were
sent to the Ilha do Bananal about ten years ago. Since then, they have sat idle next to the
shore of the Java6s River. Large land areas of crops that need tractors are almost non-
existent on the island. Family garden plots measure, at the largest, 10 meters on a side.
Most of the plants are not grown in tractor-friendly rows. The money spent on the
tractors could have been better spent providing a drip irrigation kit to each family, with
resources to spare.
Other potential projects are inappropriate no matter what material they are made from or
what technology is chosen. Socially and culturally inappropriate solutions do not aid in
development, and can create animosity between community partners and donor or
development agencies. In 2004, the government of the state of Rio de Janeiro decided
that it was necessary to intervene in the drug-related turf war that tore apart the Rocinha
and Vidigal neighborhoods. Their planned solution was to impose upon the communities
a three-meter-high wall that would surround the two neighborhoods, separating them
from the high-income areas around them (BBC, 2004). Ostensibly, this would "mark off
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Figure 10. A bric ira building in the
territory," and was not intended to "stop the violence," said Deputy Governor Luiz Paulo
Conde. The wall would have prevented outsiders from getting caught in the cross-fire,
and allowed the gangs to settle their battle for the city within a city violently without
interrupting daily life for the rest of Rio. In a country that needs to address its social and
economic inequalities, it was the worst idea possible. Such a wall would have separated
thefavelas from the few schools and jobs that are available on the outside, reversing
whatever progress had been made in terms of addressing the limited education and
employment opportunities near the low-income neighborhoods. This is one case where
working directly with community leaders would have left a really inappropriate concept
at the "brainstorm everything, even the crazy ideas" stage of project generation. The idea
immediately drew international criticism, and even the mayor of Rio de Janeiro city
spoke out against it. Creating bad public relations outside of, but especially within,
communities whose cooperation is necessary for local and national development does
nothing for establishing the credibility of a government or outside agency.
Underachieving projects
Even well-planned and well-executed projects may leave only minimal effects on the
local community. Good community partners for sustainable operations and continued
support for projects that remain in government hands will allow good projects to reach
their full potential in meeting community needs and providing long-term solutions to
daily problems. Those components are not always present in development projects, and
the correlation to mediocre achievement is evident.
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One recent example of a project falling into disrepair is the new neighborhood health
center in the Rio de Janeiro community of Mangueira de Botafogo. Built by the city
government around 1999, the building has been unoccupied since 2002. It was originally
intended to have a regular schedule of doctors, preventative health clinics, and
community day care. The government chose to build the health center in a part of the
neighborhood that was known by locals to be under the control of drug dealers. Things
went as planned for only a short while after the center's opening. Residents were hesitant
to come into a drug zone to take care of their current health problems, knowing full well
that it could cause them new and more serious health problems.
Life is always interesting in thefavelas, where even whole neighborhoods can be built up
and others torn to pieces, all under the guise of community development. In the middle
of the twentieth century, several working-classfavelas with minimal infrastructure and
high crime rates were demolished. The residents were moved to newly built housing
with utilities on the arid flatlands known as the Baixada Fluminense on the outskirts of
the city (Page, 1995). Without continued support for community building, what
promised to be an otherwise nice neighborhood devolved into a war zone similar to the
one they had left behind (Mariz, 1994). The material improvements alone provided to the
community did werenot sufficient to foster the necessary capacity to reestablish
themselves with a new, peaceful existence in the Baixada Fluminense.
One of the challenges of getting projects to meet their planned potential is knowing the
target community. This is particularly difficult for agencies without strong community
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contacts who must rely on data generated by other public bodies. For example, funding
estimates and project scale can be strongly influenced by the number of people served. In
Brazil, government censuses hugely undercount the population of low-income
neighborhoods in cities, particularly the dense, verticalfavelas, and also that of very
remote regions where accessibility to rural inhabitants is limited by environmental factors
and transportation. The national census undercount is estimated at 4%, but
undercounting in these areas is much higher. In thefavela Complexo da Mar6, for
example, the official census report showed 60,000 residents, while the neighborhood
association's own census found 138,000 - more than double the number counted in the
official census (Lazarte, 2004). Having a better understanding of the community's size
would help more projects live up to their objectives, by providing services with a
capacity sufficient for local needs.
The need to address similar inadequacies in other programs could not be clearer. The
connection between inadequate infrastructure and the bottleneck of economic expansion
needs to be stemmed by successful, community-based development programs (Smillie,
2000). Addressing the shortcomings of past projects improves the potential for future
development opportunities.
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Brazilian Policy on Knowledge and Innovation
Knowledge is now recognized as one of the key factors behind successful industrial
development. As compared with facts, knowledge involves the application of facts to a
practical use. One of those uses is the development of technology. More than just a
product, technology is a tacit and transferable type of knowledge, and it has played a role
in the industrialization of Brazil since the Vargas years. Despite policy intentions to
bring innovation into the development plan, Brazil's potential in the global knowledge
economy has gone largely unrealized.
In addition to modernizing the existing industrial facilities - increasing capacity and
efficiency - the Vargas administration created a plan for the construction of large
professional schools. The goal was to create a large network of professional research
institutions to reach all corners of the country. In theory, these universities would also
partner with local government initiatives by providing auxiliary materials and technical
guidance (Vargas, 1999). Before Vargas could get it going strong, the nation's growth
was put on pause.
Kubitschek again tried to bring knowledge into the policy equation. His administrative
plan involved the implementation of a "nuclei" of advisors. By borrowing personnel
from other state ventures, Kubitschek made some in-roads into ways to bring competence
and expertise from the rest of the bureaucracy in to advise policymakers near the top.
102
Under military rule, the objective in the knowledge field was to make Brazil
technologically self-sufficient (Skidmore, 1988). The state projects undertaken during
the Brazilian Miracle make this point very clear. Between 1964 and 1985, the military
made the nation's first attempt at an atomic energy plant (which is still online, but is
frequently shut down because of numerous design flaws), created and funded the
majority of the research institutions in existence today, and initiated a 1969 university
reform across the nation that created graduate degree programs in technical fields and
coordinated curriculums at both undergraduate and graduate levels of study (Page, 1995).
One of the results of that reform was a rapid increase in the number of Brazilians trained
in and applying scientific knowledge. For example, in 1954, there were literally only a
dozen economists in all of Brazil, all of whom worked directly for the government. By
1974, there were several thousand, advising not only the government but also major
banks, investment firms, and large corporations (Hudson, 1998). By creating state
projects and reforming technical training, policymakers tried to ensure that
industrialization would be accompanied by scientific growth both in entrepreneurial
(urban, private) and hierarchical (bureaucratic, state) agencies.
Despite the nod to the importance of knowledge, it ended up playing a side role in the
country's industrialization. Increasing production capability through mechanization
starred from year to year. Later on, one federal minister acknowledged how "naive" they
had been, and how the Brazilian Miracle had "attributed almost exclusive importance to
industrialization" such that "managers thought only in terms of machinery without being
aware [of the] economic status of the region and the lack of technical-education resources
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and adequate relationships with the country's decision-making centres" (Henshall and
Momson, 1974).
Unfortunately, the technology lobby has lost influence since the 1980s in both the public
and private spheres. Since the last military presidency and into the present day, science
and technology sectors have been treated as just another pressure group by the Planning
and Economy ministries (Hudson, 1998). Before then, when the military was spending
heavily on new hardware and research, science groups had easy access to Brazil's
leadership. Recent budgets have spent the bare minimum on science and technology
while trying to deal with debt and, until the last few years, serious inflation. In
consequence, Brazil now does less than 1% of the world's scientific research as measured
by either dollars of funding or patents awarded (OECD, 2001). Public funding is small,
but still 150% greater than private research funds (Figure 11), and almost no R&D
funding comes from overseas.
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Figure 11. Sources of Brazilian research and development funding in 2000 relative to other
countries. Source: The World Bank, 2004.
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Only a small fraction of the public investment in research and development is made by a
small group of state corporations, focusing on a narrow set of fields. All of that money
goes to oil, mining, telecommunication, and aeronautics. The remaining public
investment in research and development is connected to public university and research
institution demands. Few of these funds are ever translated to commercial applications
(OECD, 2001). Though the funding for equipment is still limited, the government has
been more than generous in providing space for researchers at universities, even though
in many cases the universities lack the managerial capacity to coordinate and lead major
research projects (The World Bank, 2004).
Even in the private sector, innovation is not yet the top priority. Over the years, the
government has required local product development in some fields like
telecommunications and computers, and supported a few other industries, notably
agricultural mechanization and military equipment (Hudson, 1998). Most of the
country's firms, as a result, have limited experience in planning and conducting
innovative research.
Research goals are limited by the way in which knowledge is neither particularly
ubiquitous nor sufficiently deep to sustain businesses that try to move ahead of the
crowd. Only 0.5% of the people who earn Ph.D.s in Brazil work in the private sector
(Husdon, 1998). This figure is much higher in countries that have a strong investment in
knowledge and research. Of United States science and engineering Ph.D.s, for example,
about 16% work in the private sector. Almost all Brazilian Ph.D.s work in the
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universities or nationalized research institutions, and must counter bureaucracy and a
work culture contrary to the fostering of innovative solutions. Of those firms that
participate in research, few of them have actual plans that guide their investments.
Because of the shortsighted planning, many of their projects are small and short-lived.
The results, then, tend to be evolutionary rather than revolutionary, and focus on
advanced development products that can be brought to market almost immediately. The
consequences are visible in the international marketplace. Very few Brazilian companies
enter into international competition on the basis of their application and extension of
knowledge (i.e. innovation).
To join the international marketplace based on innovative technological capabilities,
basic changes will have to be made to research and knowledge values in Brazil.
Localizing the knowledge will prove to be as important in the path of industrialization as
localizing manufacturing. The link between the two and the next best phase of
industrialization is for Brazil to get a greater share of the value added to products by
bringing more of the knowledge-intensive stages of production activities into the
domestic sphere.
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Recommendations for Brazilian knowledge and innovation policy
Over the last seventy years, Brazil has gotten really good at low to intermediate
technology. The additional intensity has been driven largely by inherited competitive
advantage like its abundance of natural resources and substantial investments in capital
and the production chain. The research capacity that is missing will become key to
Brazil's continued growth in the twenty-first century. There are policy options that can
place shared knowledge near the top of the development profile. A big step towards
success will include the horizontal integration of projects across the country and the
correction of inequalities that have plagued Brazil's development since colonial times.
On the whole, Brazil has been gaining by improving production capacity and project
execution skills. There are still only a few examples of Brazil at the "knowledge
frontier." Brazil could be on the world's map as a site of high-tech knowledge in the
future with
· Technology companies engaging in novel, pioneering work, rather than enlarging
and cheapening work initially done by others
* A greater number of local firms linking to information exchanges, on the basis of
a commitment to the acquisition and application of knowledge to both domestic
problems and the international marketplace
* The presence of international firms investing significantly in R&D within Brazil,
as has happened in other rapidly and successfully industrializing countries like
China and India.
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In the next few years, Brazil will have to address two main questions on how knowledge
relates to future national development. The first issue is how to improve research
productivity and quality, to provide adequate return on the resources committed. The
second issue is how to translate the best research into commercial applications. That last
step is necessary to turn research into concepts that can be applied to improving society
and economy (UNDP, 2005).
The research productivity in government and universities would benefit from tearing
down the walls between similar programs. There are a plethora of public agencies, and
many groups within universities, doing work on the same problems without
communication. Unification of similar programs, or at least cooperative communication,
would help coordinate efforts on nationally set objectives and priorities. Horizontal
integration will become important not only for multiple projects with similar objectives,
but also for those whose objectives can be related in practice to form systems-level
development based on innovative solutions.
Renewing the commitment to the university - which has faded since the 1969 education
reforms - will strengthen graduate research and improve connections between programs
throughout the country. These links will also broaden the access to academic and
technical information across different parts of the country.
Another consequence of addressing the horizontal structure of development is the general
increase in training and competence. This is true even outside of the university. One of
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Brazil's coming challenges in development is the correction of unequal income
distribution and mass poverty. The cycle between these two is a dire obstacle to future
economic growth within the nation. The poor, both urban and rural, have limited access
to information, which leads to high prices, at the household, firm, and institutional levels.
They also have lower than average levels of education. Improvements in the education
system at lower levels will qualify more people for more responsible jobs in the new
economy.
Increasing the knowledge of individuals will also increase knowledge within the firm.
Brazil has a strong entrepreneurial sector, but lacks what are known as "knowledge-based
entrepreneurs." Knowledge-based entrepreneurs are the actors who bring new ideas and
research to market. These ideas may have been conceived in a university or research
institution, but their application ends up creating gainful employment (OECD, 2001). If
the notion of creating gainful employment can become as or more culturally accepted as
rote job seeking, the transfer of research from the public sector to commercial success
will be increased by people leaving the universities. Connecting innovators to the
resulting businesses will increase technology transfer from universities to commercial
applications. Increased transfer increases return on investment of public funds by
increasing GDP. At this level and for those without as much education, lower entry
barriers will encourage people to apply their education to new small and medium sized
enterprises. The fact that it takes ten times as long to formally start a new business in
Brazil as it does in the United States (The World Bank, 2004) is an example of the
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obstacles that discourage individuals from going into business on their own in the current
environment.
No single institution can be responsible for the development of a nation. Transfer of
research from the incubation goals of the academic world to the production goals of the
commercial sphere can link institutions in the creation of new Brazilian ventures based
on innovative technology. Such transfer requires the creation of stronger relationships
between universities and businesses, both small and large, which have a domestic R&D
presence (UNDP, 2005). The university-enterprise connection can also foster the growth
of business incubators for people trying to apply their science and engineering skills to a
new business idea.
By expanding the reach of knowledge developed within Brazil's research institutions, the
country will be able to reconsider investments - replacing the uncertain future of foreign
direct investment with capital that it has more influence on. Along with economic
policies favorable to small businesses, initiatives that improve the standing of universities
and their relationship to the domestic corporate world can strengthen Brazil's future
prospects of development as an innovative industrialized nation.
One way of facilitating such relationships is the domestic innovation of solutions for
Brazil's diverse communities and their daily challenges. The exchange of technical and
regional knowledge requires the participation of local communities but is rewarded by
new opportunities for growth and innovation.
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The Opportunity for Participatory Development
The age of Pharaonic projects may have ended a few decades ago, but Brazil still makes a
sizeable budget available for underdeveloped regions and communities. For the amount
of money spent though, returns are low. Even successful projects continue to rely on the
government for funding long after they should have matured. Giving up on development
is not an option in either rural areas or in the poorest neighborhoods of urban Brazil. Past
policies have focused on the mechanization and industrialization of industry at the
expense of community and knowledge development. In order to continue the country's
growth, development must begin to move forward across the entire nation. Cities with
inadequate infrastructure - like housing and utilities - create bottlenecks for economic
expansion (Smillie, 2000). Overexploitation of the natural environment and
overemphasis on agricultural mechanization are both closely linked to rural poverty. The
link between human poverty and economic stagnation is clear, and adopting community-
based policies could be the way to the future.
One type of community-based action typically used in other sectors is participatory
development. Participatory development is a people-centered practice whose process
ensures community ownership and indeed, participation, in design, implementation, and
evaluation, of new concepts introduced to their community, usually in conjunction with
outside agents (Jennings, 2000). The ultimate foundation of participatory development is
the idea that people can and should be responsible for the development of their
communities and themselves. In the policy sphere, it means that top-down mechanisms
must give way to bottom-up mechanisms that shape local entrepreneurial ambitions.
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Grassroots needs are satisfied by increased access to information and innovation. The
catch is that the initiative must come from local inhabitants, even though outside
leadership, finance, and government do play a role (Richardson, 2000).
Each application is context-specific, and so the concept of participatory development is
inherently optimized for and even limited to work at the community level. The process
itself ensures that the solution will also be specific to the constraints of the local
community. The main process can be summarized by:
· Opening lines of communication with intended users
· Mapping user needs and suggestions to the system
* Developing a prototype in conjunction with users
* Presenting best proposal(s)
* Integrating feedback and reiterating.
The very nature of the process enables application of similar steps to a wide variety of
challenges. In Brazil, not only are the environmental, cultural, and financial situations
widely diverse across the nation, but the community needs for sustainable development
also differ. Some need the most basic technologies adapted to their living conditions
(e.g., water collection and purification in the settlements). Others lack organizational
structures that could improve economic opportunity at low capital costs (e.g., farmers'
cooperatives or ecotourism set-ups). These two common conditions, and most in
between, can be approached with similar practices.
Opening lines of communication with intended users
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The objective of participatory development is to create more successful solutions by
involving the target community in the project. Connecting with the community instills
trust and confidence in outside agents. In the other direction, people coming from outside
can begin to understand the constraints that they must work within to bring improvements
to the area. Having a good community partner is also a key to the success of introducing
individuals from diverse backgrounds. Working with someone in the community who is
trusted eases communication, even between people from different parts of the same
country. Many of the attempts at development that were present in Tocantins or in the
favelas only went halfway towards solving the problem they were meant to address.
Improved communication with the local community could have ensured much better
programs with, for example, appropriate materials and long-term sustainability. By
working with the residents, the agency that built the health center in Mangueira de
Botafogo could have selected a safer part of the neighborhood so drug activity would not
have scared locals away from going to the activities held there. Similarly, the building
materials sent to the settlements to make new houses could have been better selected if
the donor had known how hot the homes would get during the summer.
Additionally, at this stage, people and organizations are identified that can take
responsibility for the continuation of a long-term project. The most disappointing part of
any special event is when it comes to an end. Projects that are planned without the
involvement of the local community risk a lack of continuation when people have not
been involved at the early stages of growth.
113
Mapping user needs and suggestions to the system
The exciting part about working with communities and cultures that are in many ways
different from one's own are the opportunities to learn about alternative viewpoints of the
essentials of daily life. In the case of designing appropriate technology with a partner
community, what begins as small talk can become critical to project planning.
Challenges present within the community may come up that people may not even have
noticed before, because they had just been a part of life. Information about readily
available materials, services, and skills can be discerned. Data on a wide variety of topics
like those above can turn general programs into specific actions, ideas into finished
products, and hope into action.
Developing a prototype in conjunction with users
Whether working consistently in the field or long-distance, involving the future users and
co-owners will improve final results and aid in creating ownership and self-determination
within a partner community. By working with future users, important design
specifications are met throughout the process, rather than as a checklist at the end. This
keeps design flexible and ensures that expectations are being met along the way. It can
otherwise be difficult to make changes late in a design project, no matter what the final
product is destined to be: designers get attached, budgets get spent, and deadlines
approach. At the same time, the diversity of people collaborating brings a variety of
textbook and practical solutions that may not have come together had they worked
separately. For both outside engineers and community members, the process of co-
creation can lead to capacity building and empowerment for pursuing future ambitions.
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Working at such difficult problems, any process that facilitates the growth and
implementation of ideas is of benefit.
Presenting best proposal(s)
Because of the way news spreads, especially in small and tight-knit communities, many
people besides those actually working on the project will know how things are going.
This is the time to celebrate the work done, talk about possibilities for the future, and
emphasize everyone's role in making the day possible. At this point, the results really
become "theirs," and should remain a part of the community. The capacity to reproduce
those results also stays. It is, however, replicated in a way that makes it useful for more
than one occasion. The "ta-da" moment for any project can be among the best, but the
project is not over yet.
Integrating feedback and reiterating
Careful introduction of technology is critical, though. Initial reactions, verbal and non-
verbal, should become the basis for improvement. Comments on appearance, function,
cost, or even basic concept can lead to changes that were not even considered before.
Once things have been running smoothly for a while, changes that need to be made in this
community or for future evolution will become apparent. At this point, those initially
involved can help on the next revisions, leave them to be spearheaded by the long-term
community partners, and use them as a basis for options in a similar situation when
working with another community.
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Conclusion
The concept of community participation itself is not particularly revolutionary in the field
of international development. What separates the experience described here is the joining
of institutions from around the world with the objective of sharing knowledge for
community improvement. Students from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, the
Universidade de Sao Paulo, and the FundaqAo Bradesco Escola de Canuana joined
together to share local and international solutions for the daily problems encountered in a
village and settlement region of rural Brazil, like water collection and food storage. In
these communities, there are already established relationships with relevant government
agencies, but little effective or sustainable change has come about from their relationship
so far. Modified policy for interior development should incorporate local communities'
feedback and ownership to ensure long-term gains from national development.
Incorporating a process like this into domestic development efforts could make the
difference in unifying Brazil in its naxt major period of growth.
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The application of technology in participatory development
Having community partners like these involved in participatory development activities
facilitates an "injection" of technical knowledge into local community. This is not to say
that the results could not have been done by the community itself, or that the results will
be totally-new-never-been-done-before solutions. The key is turning user needs and
suggestions into applied solutions. Some of the suggested concepts may already have
been present in the community, but may not have been expressed in the "right" way to
initiate action on applying them as a solution to everyday problems.
Outside input also brings with it the network of agencies, universities, and other groups
that share experiences worldwide. In this way, such organizations can bring a local
solution to a global audience. Intermediary organizations may facilitate dissemination
since it is easier for communities to find or be found by an intermediary (e.g., MIT) than
to make direct contact with other communities, because of their similar and shared
limitations. As a result, meetings of participatory design bring about not just "wowie"
new solutions, but also an application of this canon of solutions developed in distant
communities that have faced similar constraints to meeting their goals with available
resources. Often, a direct transfer of an idea directly from one location to another is not
effective. But, by integrating feedback from the community, modifications can be made
so an idea suits the local constraints without completely "reinventing the wheel."
During extended field work in Canuand and the assentamentos of Tocantins, MIT
students worked with other students from the Universidade de Sio Paulo and the local
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Escola de Canuana to explore relevant solutions to the challenges faced in daily life in the
rural cerrado. After getting to know the community and discussing their local needs and
ambitions, technical concepts were exchanged. Solutions from outside were welcomed
as concepts that could be applied to Tocantins, and the school's own designs were
recorded to share with other communities that MIT works with.
The concepts and designs explored in Tocantins had counterparts local to other parts of
Brazil (e.g., the Centro de Inclusao Digital), with origins at MIT (e.g., the Test Water
Cheap water analysis kit) or other research institutions (e.g., Light Up The World WLED
lights and low-cost drip irrigation), or from distant communities with similar day-to-day
constraints (e.g., the pot-in-pot). Each of these technologies met a need of the local
community. Some needed more adaptation than others to be effective in an area different
from the one they were originally designed for. The technology case studies are not to
determine success but rather to discover what needs to be in place for their
implementation. A similar model could be used in national development plans with
greater effect than previous methods. Those that were most adaptable to the local
conditions may become a part of daily life in the aldeia Canuana or the assentamentos.
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Technology: CID
The Centro de InclusAo Digital (or CID, Center for Digital Inclusion) is a national project
started by the Fundagio Bradesco to bring information technology labs to communities
across Brazil. The objective of the CID initiative is to promote the effort to join the
information age and stimulating social responsibility and action (Fundagio Bradesco,
2005e).
The Fundagao has been working with multinational corporations from the IT sector since
1997, developing curricula for teaching student mentors as well as for local mentors who
will teach community members, and organizing volunteer service and donated hardware.
The first events in 2003's Mgs Nacional de Inclusdo Digital (National Month of Digital
Inclusion) were so successful in terms of attendance, learning, and community
excitement, that a possibility to offer permanent access was sought.
Finally, in 2004, 22 centers were opened across the nation (Figure 12). Mostly located in
small towns and villages, they served around 10,000 clients in their first year of operation
alone. The goal for 2005 is to open 18 more, including the first in an indigenous village,
at the aldeia Canuani in Tocantins.
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Figure 12. Locations of the first 22 CIDs, including the one opened in Canuani in January, 2005
(light grey, center of state). Adapted from Fundaqio Bradesco, 2005e.
The first and primary goal of the CID (Valente, 2005) is to increase public access to
information technology and digital equipment. Through this technology, the CIDs are to
be used to increase opportunities for participative social management and youth
proactiveness in the local and greater Brazilian community. For their first 18 months off
the ground, the CIDs have done remarkably. The long-term goals of the Fundagdo
Bradesco go beyond bringing IT to rural communities, and extend to the very roots of the
places they are a part of. Through the CIDs, it is hoped to:
· Foster local autonomy and acts of citizenship
· Increase school participation and support of the Bradesco foundation
* Create a social activism network around the country
* Train facilitators and community leaders through the curricula at the CID
* Use the schools and CID as a sociocultural reference point for each region.
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The success of the CID in the IT realm will then be used as a booster for conversion of
the CID and school network to a Centro de Incluslo Social, forming a rede (web) of
socially inclusive organizations that serve primarily rural or low-income communities.
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Application: CID
Opening a CID in Canuani was a new adventure for the Fundamao Bradesco. This was
the first CID to open in an indigenous village, which presented an entirely new set of
challenges. People from MIT and the Universidade de Sio Paulo helped make it a
successful event for everyone involved. In an IT situation, technological hurdles always
arise. Besides those, there were also cultural and linguistic challenges to be met before
and during the opening of the Canuana CID.
The plans for the center include ten workstations and a central server that doubles as a
workstation for the mentor. Once the computers were working, a printer and scanner
were added. As of spring 2005, a digital camera is also made available at the CID. To
assure a clean and consistent power supply, power is provided by connecting the center to
the power facilities at the school. Internet connections are also made to the school - from
the workstation, to the central server, by radio across the river Java6s to the school, and
then by satellite.
Getting the hardware to cooperate is only the first stage of preparation. Another big
concern is how to introduce digital technology to an ethnic society with strong traditions.
All over the world, increasing contact and trade with other cultures has tended to
diminish culture traditions. In indigenous groups that have until now been relatively
isolated by the rural nature and vast expanse of their countries, rapid introduction into
modern technology and the information age has the possibility of eroding traditional
belief systems, practices, and teachings. The risk grows as younger generations are more
122
and more attracted to interactions with outside groups and traditional teachings are taught
less and used less in daily life.
Even from an outside perspective, the importance of the new CID to village life and its
presence as a village space open to everyone is evident. The community decided to put it
in one of the newer buildings which also has some offices of FUNAI, the Indian affairs
agency of Brazil, and of the local cacique (village political leader). The building is very
close to the river, signifying its centrality in daily Canuana life. In other regions, being
situated near local and national government offices would make people wary of using the
facilities. Here, the relationship between villagers, local leadership, and FUNAI has been
positive overall. The proximity suggests their approval and support, rather than control.
In big letters above the door, the indigenous language for the CID has been painted - in
the same size as the Portuguese. Known in Iny as the Itya Wo-d Tamjderexina, the local
name brings together existing word roots to make a name that derives from
communication and togetherness. Two of the traditional Java6 headdresses frame the
door to the CID, one for the cacique and one for the paj. The headdresses represent not
just these two individuals, but also the long tradition through which the positions have
been handed down (and, recently, elected!) and the strength that they give to the society.
Inside, the local theme continues. Recently painted white walls were repainted again as
part of making the CID a Java6 space. Indigenous cultures in Brazil and elsewhere
around the world often have geometric designs that represent things or characteristics in
the world around them. One of the teachers at the local school, escola taind, had been
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collecting drawings of these patterns as a sort of cultural database. Local painters chose
several of these to line the walls (Figure 13) of the CID, personalizing it for the village.
Another wall was chosen to host pen and paper drawings and then later, in addition,
printed drawings by the children of Canuani (Figure 14).
Figure 13. The patterns chosen by the Javae painters represent, from left to right, the letter S, the
spines of a bush, beans, and a chameleon.
Figure 14. ay draw representations
of their family and the cultural characters that are a part of their lives, children in Canuani draw
palmeira houses along the river with palm trees and sunshine, as well as traditionally painted dancers
and spirits like Haruani. From left to right: a palmeira house; two girls practicing drawing on
computer with traditional patterns; a pen and paper drawing of a Txyreheni, a traditional dancer.
Adults were also interested in looking at internet materials related to the Java6 and other
indigenous peoples in the Tocantins region. Popular destinations included a project on
the Java6 language that the village took part in with the Universidade Federal de Rio de
Janeiro (Maia, 1986) and videos of the most recent Jogos dos Povos Indigenas (Native
People's Games - a nationwide contest of traditional and introduced sports). Though
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popular at home, no American cartoons or Brazilian telenovela stars had come into the
CID yet.
In addition to the cultural challenges, more tangible difficulties were also present.
Language, in particular, is one area where information technology (the CIDs) and the
users will have to meet in the middle. Computers rarely speak the same language as
humans, as evidenced by the special dialects, known as Scheme, FORTRAN, etc., needed
to tell them what to do. Even entering information for other humans, though, and
understanding how to transmit that information, requires language that was not common
before the prevalence of computers and still does not exist for societies where
information technology is new.
Most of the Java6 in Canuani are bilingual in Portuguese and the local language, Iny.
For communication between people in the community, they tend to use Iny, which is also
used as a written language. For beginning computer users, this presents a problem when
there is no key for some of the letters in their alphabet. Those characters, like Y (small
Latin letter Y with tilde), are often available from extra symbol menus in internationally
mainstream programs like Microsoft Office, but even using them on the web for searches
or entering personal information on forms lies somewhere between difficult and
impossible. Omitting diacritical marks is not a sufficient option in Iny. As many as four
options are available for one letter (e.g. Y, Y, 9, and y).
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Learning how to use, mentor, and maintain the CIDs has also required the creation of
new words and concepts in the Iny language. The local name for the CID itself is an
abstraction created from roots that already existed in the language. Itya Wo-d
Tamyderexina translates roughly to People's (Itya) Place (Wo-d ) for Communication and
Togetherness (Tampderexina). But other common computer phrases like "mouse,"
"browser," and "processor" presented new barriers to new users and people learning to be
mentors in the center. Between the visitors from the Fundago, MIT, and USP, and a few
people from Canuani who had experience with computers outside the village, translations
were found for all the most common words. An attempt was made to bridge the gap by
using words in Iny that matched the etymological concept in Portuguese. So, the Iny
word for mouse is used for o rato, and to browse is related to the Portuguese word to
navigate (navegar) rather than the passive "browse" activity preferred in the English
language.
Some of these linguistic issues still need to be resolved, but part of this is a matter of time
and a matter of learning. The more time people have to work with and talk about new
technology, the more opportunity they will have to find ways to discuss it in terms that
match their own reality. The language created within that space will reinforce the local
ownership of the center.
The introduction of the CID when it was finally ready had to make clear to everyone
involved that the center was a village space for everyone. Though it was initially set up
and largely funded by people outside the village, the transition to local ownership was as
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important part of the center's opening. Even before the opening, a sense of ownership
developed among those in the village who had been working towards its opening. People
from Canuang had been involved in the siting, building, painting, and purchase of CID
equipment; they had invested their time, effort, and money into the project.
By opening day, work had been going on in the CID for almost two weeks. People
would come and go, take a chair and watch the work, then leave. The sun coming in
through the open windows was often hidden by people who preferred to watch from
outside, climbing onto the ledges or standing on each other's shoulders. Once the
computers were all online, people started to come in and ask what they could do with the
new computers, where the computers (and we) had come from, and, most importantly,
when the village would get to start using them.
At the same time, another group of students from the three visiting schools (MIT, USP,
Escola de Canuan§) were walking through the village and spreading the news about the
opening of the CID. Although it had been the biggest news in Canuani for the last
month, a personal introduction was important, especially to women and the older
generation. After hearing about the CID, and learning about the people, their families,
and what sorts of things they thought they might want to use it for, we took pictures for
them and the opening night ceremony. This would be the first time that many of them
would see (and keep) a picture of themselves, and to beat that, they would be projected in
the Canuani meeting hall at sizes larger than life. For many of them, this was their first
step into the new digital world.
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The opening day slideshow was part of a day-long celebration that formalized the transfer
of the CID from its set-up phase with the Funda9io Bradesco, MIT, and USP, to its
operation phase as village public space. The celebration was important to symbolically
and openly acknowledge the change of hands. A formal ribbon-cutting was officiated by
leaders from the Escola de Canuani and the cacique of Canuand, followed by a town
meeting and traditional celebration songs and dance. The whole ceremony was video-
taped as the beginning of a collection of cultural records that could be shared by the Java6
from the CID computers.
The village of CanuanA had to start learning the basics in order to make the most use of
the CID, and to share cultural information from the Ilha do Bananal to other groups
within and far from Brazil. In the first days after opening, mentors from the Escola de
Canuani helped early adopters learn the basics in computer use, common applications,
and creative potential. Within a few weeks, the teachers from the village's escola taind
joined them. The local teachers were introduced to more advanced processes, common
maintenance needs, and the curricula that were intended to get people "up to speed" to
meet various personal and academic goals. Until the middle of 2005, the mentors from
Escola de Canuand will be working with the teachers. After that, the school will step
back, and all management will be done in the village. Because Escola de Canuan is
right across the river from the CID, they will still be available for problems beyond the
current capabilities of the new CID mentors. This maintenance plan reinforces the
community's interaction within and ownership of the CID.
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Material taught at the CID by the mentors reflects the community's state of development
and their hopes for the future. Meeting people around the village throughout the
preparation of the CID allowed plenty of opportunity to learn what people were interested
in doing and how the new public access to IT could facilitate their ambitions. Teaching
plans were matched to community goals (Table 5) so that group classes could be offered
where the people of Canuani could work together to meet their personal and shared
goals.
Ambition Skills taught
Keep in touch with people far away Webmail, typing
Cultural database/collections/recordings Scanner, Digital camera, Paint
Education Paint, typing, educational games
Joining island ecotourism Website design, cameras
Market, government information Browsing, searching
Table 5. Courses taught at the CID will coordinate the villagers' goals with the skills that will be
taught.
The contacts made by their common ambitions extend beyond Canuani, even beyond
Tocantins and Brazil. But surrounding these ambitions is the goal to maintain and share
the traditional way of life on the Ilha do Bananal. The CID supports this goal, as well as
the development of new economic opportunities, and the exposure to new creative media.
For some developing communities, this kind of an endeavor may not be technically,
financially, or culturally feasible. In Canuana, all of the needed conditions came together
so that the CID could be used to help them further their goals of economic development
and cultural exchange.
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Technology: Test Water Cheap
All over the world, ensuring water quality is a challenge to public health. The high cost
and difficulty of conventional water testing procedures limit their applicability to
developing countries, but a recent innovation by MIT students may be changing that.
The Test Water Cheap water analysis kit is an inexpensive way to quantitatively analyze
the e. coli and total coliform count in suspect water.
Clean water is one of the few essentials to life on earth, yet over one billion people
worldwide do not have access to it (The World Bank, 2003). In most cases, the water is
contaminated with fecal matter or other coliform bacteria. Consuming such contaminated
water can lead to diarrhea and other water-borne diseases.
Even contaminated water, however, can look and smell clean enough to drink. If there is
no other water around and no clear doubt about its safety, people will use it. There is no
way to know whether a community's water is bacterially contaminated without doing
quantitative analysis, but conventional analysis is expensive. Unfortunately, existing
commercial systems have capital costs of around $1,000, and each water test costs around
$6, putting them out of reach of small communities in developing countries.
Designed by MIT Amy Smith and refined by MIT engineering students in a program on
technology for development, Test Water Cheap is an inexpensive product for testing
microbial contamination of water (Chandalia, et al., 2004). It is intended to help
communities distinguish safe from contaminated water sources; to evaluate how well
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water treatment methods are working; and to serve as a diagnostic tool for health care
workers in regions affected by water-borne diseases.
To meet the objective of designing an inexpensive and reliable way to quantitatively test
water, a new process was developed to use a concept similar to that used by conventional
equipment, but with cheap and readily available materials (Figure 15). The base of the
design is a baby bottle with disposable drop-in sterile inserts. These are relatively cheap
and convenient in most parts of the world. (In the communities visited by MIT, they
would be easiest to find in thefavelas. They would not be available in CanuanA itself,
but in some of the state's larger cities and certainly in Palmas.) The drop-in inserts,
though they add an additional recurring cost, ensure sterility for the least cost and waste
per test. The bottle is then topped with a metal washer, filter paper, wire mesh, rubber
washer, and a spout, all fixed by a screw-on lid. The spout is connected to a large syringe
by a length of rubber hose.
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Metal Washer Metal Mesh Screw-on Lid
Rubber Washer
Rubber Tube & Syringe
Figure 15. The components of the Test Water Cheap kit disassembled (top) and assembled (bottom).
Source: Chandalia, et al., 2004.
By pulling the syringe, water is drawn through the filter paper, through the rubber hose,
and into the syringe. The bacteria are collected on the filter paper. When a 100 mL
sample's worth of bacteria has been collected on the filter paper, a Petri dish is prepared
by adding 2 mL of "broth," or bacteria food, to stimulate the growth of colony forming
units (cfus). The filter paper is placed in the Petri dish and covered to incubate. After 24
hours of incubation at about 350C, the Petri dish can be opened and the bacteria count
made.
The overall costs for the system are far lower than for conventional testing. The capital
costs are less than $20. The total cost for a sterile insert, a circle of filter paper, and the
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broth for the bacteria amounts to less than $2.50 for each test. Thus, the capital costs
have been reduced to 1% of conventional systems, and the recurring costs to 16% of
conventional systems.
After more than a year of testing, with samples run in over a dozen countries, the design
is performing around the level of accuracy of the commercial versions (Coulbert, 2004)
but at a fraction of the cost. The Test Water Cheap system will soon be usable the world
over to facilitate alternate clean water sourcing, water treatment method selection and
evaluation, and disease control.
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Application: Test Water Cheap
The Test Water Cheap system was an ideal candidate for testing and sharing with a
technically-focused school in the rural region of a developing country, like the Escola de
Canuand. Water testing in Brazil provided interesting results that will be useful in the
design and examination of new technologies, gave feedback that the designers of the
water test can integrate into a future design more suitable for this environment, and gave
the local organization the capability to continue performing water tests as needed.
Water testing
Samples from the Escola de Canuani, where the water is treated before being sent to the
taps, kitchens, and other points of use, tested clean for e. coli and other types of coliform.
The water in the village and the settlements had high counts of e. coli and other types of
coliform.
For now, however, the results are not very beneficial to the people using the water. The
presence of coliform bacteria did demonstrate the need for cleaner water sources or
improved treatment and storage of water once extracted. Any treatment is an
improvement over using the water straight, as is current practice. The ability to test the
water will be useful in the future for analyzing prototype designs for water purification
and storage.
The biggest challenge in using the Test Water Cheap system in Tocantins was the high
turbidity of the water. The water extracted from the river and wells had a high
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concentration of suspended solids, primarily clay, and in some locations green algae. For
easier use and improved quantitative results in this region and other areas with high
turbidity water, the process or system will have to be modified to include a method for
removing these solids before trying to collect the coliform on the filter paper. This is one
example of how a great technical idea can be improved for local use based on the
characteristics of the surrounding environment.
Teaching water testing
It was possible to do a large number of water tests over quite a large land area because
the students at the Escola de Canuana were part of the testing team. The relative
simplicity of the Test Water Cheap design makes it easy to teach non-experts how to use
the system, and the low capital and recurring costs required to make the tests ensure that
it can be used without concern of depleting local financial resources.
MIT students demonstrated the testing method to the students from the Escola de
Canuana's Grupo de Saide Rural while being video-taped. The video-tape will make it
easier to review the first-hand instructions. Review can ensure that the process is not
modified or degraded over time, and that even as students move on from the GSR, that
the method can still be used for water testing in the region.
Students from Escola de Canuan! then did water tests from the school's tap water
(purified, treated, and filtered) and from the river Java6s (untreated). Tests were done in
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pairs so students could learn from each other and rely on their partners to answer most
questions they would have through doing the procedure for the first time.
After the initial testing, groups went back to the village and to the settlements to take
water samples at peoples' homes and in public and natural water sources. When the tests
were done, the testing equipment was left as a gift to the school. Replacement materials
(bacteria food, filter papers, etc.) are available in Brazil, though they will have to be
shipped or driven in from a larger city like Palmas, capital of Tocantins.
Test Water Cheap provides the opportunity to do accurate and inexpensive water quality
testing locally, but there are some concerns for the sustainability of its application.
Looking at the materials cycle necessary for a test can demonstrate why. For one, the
materials may be more difficult and more expensive to obtain in Tocantins. They should
be available from Palmas, at the most distant, which has a nascent biotech industry and
university research programs in biology. Gurupi is closer and also has biology
laboratories. Another question comes up after the tests: what to do with non-
biodegradable and potentially hazardous materials? The plastics have to be either
recycled or landfilled. The coliform colonies have to be thoroughly killed with bleach
before being disposed of. Presumably the school's campus can handle this, but doing
field tests will require on-site disposal or carrying live bacteria back to the school for
disposal. Issues like these will have to be kept in mind for future revisions to the product
and for each test undertaken in a potentially sensitive region.
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Technology: Low-power WLED lights
The condition of utilities infrastructure in rural areas limits or prohibits access to
electricity in significant portions of developing countries, including much of rural
Tocantins. Living off-grid is a constraint to many daily activities. Moreover, evening
activities are severely limited by the lack of light needed to work, study, or do household
chores. The effective shortening of the day limits opportunities for economic or personal
development. One such organization that literally lengthens the day in many developing
countries is the Light Up The World Foundation, an international humanitarian
organization affiliated with the University of Calgary. The Light Up The World
Foundation is dedicated to illuminating the lives of the world's poor (LUTW, 2004c).
Since 1997, LUTW has been installing solid-state lighting technology in homes around
the world. The white-light emitting diode (WLED) provides an affordable, safe, healthy,
efficient, and environmentally responsible option for lighting in homes. It is an
alternative to kerosene lamps and meager, short-lived incandescent lights (Table 6).
WLEDs on battery, photovoltaic, or human power have other advantages over the grid.
The use of centralized power in rural areas also increases the monetary and
environmental costs of electricity. The installation costs of electric transmission are very
high, as are the costs of eventual transmission. In large part, this is a result of the low
efficiency of transmission.
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Lamp
Type
Efficiency
(Lumens/watt)
Rated Life
(Hours)
Durability
Power Consumption
Correlated Color
Temperature°K
Color rendering index
$ After
50 000 hours
Homemade Compact WLEDIncandescent Foresct WLEDKerosene Fluorescent
0.03 5 - 18 30 - 79 25 - 50
Supply of 1,000 6,500 -15,000 50,000
Kerosene
Fragile & Very Very Durable
Dangerous Fragile Fragile
0.04 - 0.06 5W 4W 1W
liters / hour
~1,800 ° 2,652 ° 4,200 ° 5,000 °
- 80 98 62 82
1,251 175 75 20
Table 6. Comparison of lighting characteristics for kerosene, incandescent and compact fluorescent
lights, and WLEDs. Source: LUTW, 2004b.
Each light is part of a pre-made printed circuit board with the appropriate connections left
open for a variety of power sources. The flexibility of the circuit allows mass-produced
lighting to be converted to a range of power sources depending on local availability, but
also adds to the cost of each light unit.
The WLED and circuit are nested in a hard plastic case. Inside the case, the electrical
components are safe from water, animals, and other possible hazards. The top of the case
is a lens, which distributes the WLED light over a room-sized area. When connected to a
power source, the light immediately floods the home (no switch was built into the set-up
tested in Canuani). This particular system has been used now in over 4,000 homes
worldwide (LUTW, 2004c), including those in the assentamentos of Canuani.
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Application: Low-power WLED lights
LUTW's low-cost, low-power WLED solution to rural lighting needs sounded like it
might just be the thing for Tocantins. Current technology in the settlements and in less
affluent families in the aldeia Canuani is still kerosene lamps, which cause significant
quantities of indoor air pollution (Warwick and Doig, 2004), have high recurring fuel
costs, and do not provide sufficient light. The WLED lights are long-lasting, with limited
recurring costs depending on fuel source, and no indoor pollution. After trying them out
in the settlements with the students from the GSR, it became clear that the LUTW lights
were not ideal for the local reality of rural Tocantins, though.
With a car battery scrounged for power and a shelf to "hang" it on, the first low-power
WLED light was turned on in the assentamentos of Canuani. The cold white light
overwhelmed the kerosene lamp which burns in the house throughout both night and day,
illuminating the black streaks on the wall where smoke residue had stained clay tiles over
the years. The house was marvelously lit for the visit by students from MIT and the
Escola de Canuani, casting away the shadows that darkened the house even under the
bright Brazilian sun.
The light provided by one LUTW WLED was sufficient for lighting the traditional palm-
covered houses, and easily overpowered the kerosene lights used in many settlement
homes. However, at 12 V and a list price of US$35 for a 1.5 W bulb (LUTW, 2004a),
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dissemination within this community may not be easy. Some of the key specifications
don't meet the electrical or financial means commonly available to individual families.
In Canuand, idle car batteries (12 V) are not very common, though new batteries can be
obtained from as nearby as Formoso do Araguaia (60 km). Where they exist, there is
likely to already be lighting or better uses for the car battery. If the LUTW lights could
be run off of AA through D cells, which are much more readily available in the area and
at far better cost, there would be decreased resistance to using them. In an economy
where money is only obtained when it's needed, the $35 per light price structure is
incompatible with purchase by individual families. At that cost, it would be necessary for
the settlements to find a partner organization to support the costs and installation of the
lights. Since the lights are rated for 50,000 hours (LUTW, 2004b), replacement costs are
not an issue. Such a set-up may be typical for the clients that LUTW works with right
now, but there are no such organizations working in Tocantins today. Direct negotiation
with LUTW may also achieve a lower direct cost to the community, but that would also
be difficult due to the lack of telephone service and people who speak English in the
assentamentos.
Another possibility for disseminating WLED lights in areas like Canuani has opened up
in recent years. The increasing availability of low-cost WLED lights made as flashlights
for the developed world makes banks of WLEDs possible for low-income areas. An
array of WLED flashlights could be run from AA batteries for the same cost as one of the
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more flexible LUTW. Lights like this are an example of how mass-manufactured
products can be applied to problems in underdeveloped regions.
This is not to say that these low-power WLED lights would not be useful for another
community or another organization, but it is a good example of how certain assumptions
about the design or distribution methods of a new technology can determine its
appropriateness in target communities. Despite the seeming match between the local
needs and the objectives of the LUTW lights, it is unlikely that this community will be
adopting them as quickly as they might adopts some of the other technologies presented
in these case studies. The local constraints particular to Canuani make them less than
ideal for the Canuani families who would need them the most.
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Technology: Pot-in-pot
Another consequence of the limited availability of electricity is inadequate food storage.
For many rural areas, subsistence farming is the norm. It provides little extra food for
families or additional income, and the lack of adequate food storage increases the
proportion of that food that goes to waste. The pot-in-pot preserves the food using
traditional non-electric methods. The technique has been used for thousands of years, but
in the 1990s, the innovation of a Nigerian schoolteacher brought it into renewed
widespread use.
For at least the last three thousand years, water-cooled pots have been used in Egypt for
cooling wine. Other parts of Africa and Latin America have also lined water and wine
pots with damp sand, cooling the liquids inside to provide refreshment in the hot weather
(RAE, 2004). Mohammed Bah Abba, who came from a long line of potters from the
rural north of Nigeria, had always been fascinated by the way that water seeped through
porous pots and evaporated from their surface.
From this observation came the technical improvements that renewed the use of pots for
cooling worldwide. Abba's experiments eventually led to the design that made headlines
around the world. Between two earthenware pots, one of a slightly smaller diameter than
the other, a layer of sand is packed. Water poured into the sand spreads throughout the
layer. The evaporation of water requires a relatively large amount of energy, which
draws heat away from the inner pot. Evaporated water leaves through the porous clay of
the outer pot, and the water remaining in the sand is cooler. A similar process is present
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in nature; the same concept applies when animals sweat and when leaves transpire
through pores (Time, 2001).
The key innovation behind Abba's design was the creation of a cool air space in the inner
pot and the use of the sand-water mix instead of just water in the interstitial layer. Other
improvements that Abba made to the cooling pot improved the efficiency of the
evaporation. Some versions include a lip on the pot edge that covers the sand-filled gap,
preventing the evaporation of water from the top of the pots. Additional efficiency is
provided by adding a damp cloth over the opening of the smaller pot. The cloth protects
the food inside from the sunlight and holds a large quantity of water on an additional
evaporative surface that lengthens the amount of time cooling is provided before the sand
dries out.
As a result of these protections, the temperature drop is significant. Depending on the
humidity (the pot-in-pot is more effective in drier air), the temperature of the inside pot
can be 10 to 15°C cooler than ambient air. This slows the growth of bacteria and the
kinetics of food decay (e.g. by ethylene emission from the decomposition of ethephon in
ripening fruits and vegetables). The high inner humidity is also ideal for storing
vegetables. Using this design, the shelf-life of a variety of foods could be extended.
Abba's results showed that tomatoes stayed fresh for three weeks, not days (Time, 2001);
that spinach lasted in the pot-in-pot for up to 12 days, whereas outside it wilted within
hours (Lubick, 2000); and that eggplants were edible for 27 days instead of three (ITDG,
2001).
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Improved storage techniques have several advantages for the rural Nigeria communities
they were first designed for. First, the sale of surplus fruits and vegetables was no longer
a buyer's market - farmers did not have to sell everything the day of the harvest, but
could instead store the food for bigger markets and better prices (Lubick, 2001).
Additionally, the pot-in-pot allowed "mini-markets" to open, where women could sell
food from their homes (ITDG, 2001). Foods stored in pot-in-pots had reduced bacteria
counts compared to food stored in the open, and could be connected to reductions in
food-borne diseases. The pot-in-pot also provided an alternative to dried foods - which
both limit the variety of foods allowed in the diet (some foods cannot be dried) and
reduce nutritional intake (some vitamins, like vitamin C, are not well-preserved by
drying) (Lubick, 2001).
Besides the innovative double-pot design and specific application to food, Abba
revolutionized the distribution of the product and the education to use it. After first
starting the project on his teacher's salary and giving the pots away for free in his and
neighboring villages, the project is now able to sustain itself. The cost of making each
pot is US$0.30 (ITDG, 2001). By selling them for US$0.40 (Lubick, 2001), Abba makes
a US$0.10 profit on each pot which is being used to fund the project's expansion
throughout northern Nigeria.
By the end of the 1990s, Abba and his factories had distributed 10,000 pot-in-pot systems
all around northern Nigeria (RAE, 2004). He estimated that it would take another five
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years to bring the pot-in-pot to every village in northern Nigeria. Meanwhile, attention
from the mainstream press and development agencies around the world has made it
possible to bring the idea to worldwide distribution at a much faster rate than one man
alone ever could. The transfer of knowledge has hastened access to improved food
storage solutions using local materials for a "local" global solution.
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Application: Pot-in-pot
The pot-in-pot turned out to be ideally suited for Brazilian needs. Originally invented in
Nigeria, the pot-in-pot is an option for practical unpowered refrigeration in many regions
where improvements in food storage are needed. The students in the Grupo de Safide
Rural and the people living in the settlements liked it so much that it has its own
Portuguese name now: o pote-no-pote.
For Tocantins, the pote-no-pote was an obvious choice to meet existing manufacturing
capacity. The area is well-known for its carefully formed ceramics and pottery. Potters
use the abundant porous red clay that can be found in the roads, as floors in homes, in
ditches, along the river, and anywhere else in the area. This type of clay is ideal for
making pottery that can "breathe." Additionally, the shape is simple enough that any of
the local potters can work with it.
The students were immediately taken with the idea. One of them, whose family still lives
in a settlement while she attends the residential Escola de Canuand, was eager to share
this technology with her family when she went back during break. In her house, she said,
her family had several pots "just like this one" that were not being used. With some sand
and water, they could now be used before to solve one of their constant challenges in a
way that hadn't occurred to them before.
With the school's Environmental Education teacher, Lucr6cio Filho de Oliveira, contacts
were made with a local potter to have experimental pots made to match the ones that had
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been brought from MIT. A pot-in-pot made locally in Tocantins will not cost more than
US$3, a sum affordable to most families in the area. Others can use already purchased
pots for this purpose if it is of enough value to them. The first pots are being made to
demonstrate that the Tocantins clay is porous enough for the pot-in-pot to work well.
Once their efficacy has been demonstrated, more can be made to disseminate the
technology to other families in the area. This is happening in spring and summer 2005
through the settlement association meetings.
In this way, a straightforward scientific concept with a practical application will be taught
to the people who most need improved food storage and those who can create new job
opportunities to meet increased demand for local pottery. The concept and its
manufacture were easily transferable between regions with little to no adaptation.
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Technology: Drip irrigation
Drip irrigation is a proven method to reduce the water needed for cultivation. By
delivering water directly to the plant through tubing, a minimal amount of water is lost
between the water source and the root system. The process of drip irrigation has also
been conventionally associated with large commercial farms that can afford the capital-
intensive set-up (IDE, 2003a). For rural farmers though, an affordable drip irrigation kit
was not readily available and produced until 1995.
The International Development Enterprises (IDE) "Easydrip" irrigation kit tested in
Brazil by the MIT team holds up to 20 liters of water in a storage bag suspended over the
garden. The storage bag needs to be both durable and watertight. Finding those two
characteristics in the same material leads to more expensive materials that are difficult to
source locally and are either more difficult or more expensive to manufacture. For this
kit, the solution is a bi-layered storage bag: the outside layer is made of rugged woven
plastic, like rice bags, and the inside is like a heavyweight garbage bag made of thick
dark polyethylene. Neither material is sufficient without the other. A threaded cap is
screwed into one bottom corner, allowing the pipes to be attached by a valve with a
threaded end. A central pipe runs from the storage bag to the ground, then splits into
several smaller pipes that can be laid out to match the locations of the plants. The pipes
themselves are made of flexible black polyvinyl chloride with plastic drippers inserted at
intervals. The dripper is made of similar material, with thinner outer diameter and thicker
pipe walls. A knot in the dripper pipe can be adjusted to control the direction and rate of
flow. The tradeoff on using the flexible pipes though is the decreased life span; the pipes
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are expected to last only one to two years (IDE, 2003a). IDE has shown in other markets
that most customers find the short useful lifespan of the flexible pipes acceptable because
of their low cost and ease of set-up. Other drip irrigation sets from the same organization
which use rigid pipes have an expected useful lifetime of up to five years for three to five
times the cost of the flexible pipes. These are primarily targeted at owners of commercial
plots.
Getting the irrigation kit ready to use is quick and easy (Figure 16). Only one to two
meters of head are needed, so the bag can be strung between two trees without much
effort. With the main pipe screwed into the storage bag, the sub-main and lateral pipes
can then be spread out and lined up with the plants. For the average family garden plot in
Tocantins, only the smallest version (up to 25 m2) is needed. This was sufficient for
many garden plots. If the entire plot was larger than 25 m 2, people were still interested in
being able to control flow to the plants that need the most water for successful growth.
System Configuration:
15 mm Submain (with 5 tees) INo.
12mm Lateral line (with 130 microtubes) SNos.
Figure 16. A typical set-up of an IDE drip-irrigation kit. Source: IDE, 2003a.
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The manufacturer, IDE, is a non-profit international NGO run "like a business" (Polak,
2004). The organization designs, markets, and disseminates solutions for the rural poor
worldwide. Many of their technologies, including the drip irrigation set-up, focus on the
access to and use of water as a requirement for escaping the cycle of poverty (IDE,
2003b). Each design is intended to meet the founder's philosophy of high-volume
technology dissemination for development. As he summarized his objective in a recent
lecture, "Can I sell a million of these?" (Polak, 2004).
The mass manufacturability of solutions for development cannot be applied to
everything, everywhere. But the needs of enough communities in enough regions are
sufficiently similar that the approach can be used for some of the basic needs with
technology manufactured from local, basic, materials available worldwide. Most of
IDE's local manufacturing centers to date are in Southeast Asia and in Africa, but they
have been moving into South America. In these regions, they have been able to
successfully market appropriate and affordable technologies to the rural poor.
South America, and in particular Brazil, is an ideal market for disseminating similar
technologies. It is also a region with extensive knowledge of plastics and strong
manufacturing capabilities at low prices as a result of 100 years of development through
mechanization. If the water technologies can be as successful in Brazil as they have been
in other parts of the world, like they have proven to be in Tocantins, it may be an ideal
direction for expansion.
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Application: Drip irrigation
Between November and March, it rains every day in Tocantins, softening the clay needed
to make pote-no-pote and other ceramics; but the cerrado experiences extremes in
precipitation over the course of the year. In July and August there is almost no
precipitation, and all the months from April to October are dry enough that keeping crops
watered is a challenge. Druing the dry season, arduous labor is required to extract water
from wells and drag it across the property to any actively cultivated areas on the
settlement. It may be surprising that an inexpensive drip irrigation kit could be useful in
Tocantins, just one state away from the renowned rain forests of Amazonas.
For families in the aldeia Canuana and in the settlements, a planned area of crops is
common. Depending on the family's size, wealth, and occupation, the plot can range
from three to ten square meters (Ramos, 2004). Typical plants include manioc (also
known as cassava or yucca), watermelon, beans, and corn. All of these plants require
additional water during the dry season, and the irrigation kit is large enough to meet those
needs.
At the time MIT visited Canuana, a few irrigation kits were installed for tests. This was
in the start of the rainy season, so the irrigation has not yet come to its most difficult
challenges. The GSR students and those in the settlements we visited found the irrigation
kits easy to figure out, install, and prepare for irrigation, using the included instructions
(Figure 17).
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Figure 17. Students from the Escola de Canuana practice setting up an irrigation kit on campus
before taking it to the settlements.
Not only does the IDE irrigation kit turn out to be appropriate for the drier months in
Canuand, it is also affordable. The irrigation system can cost as little as R$ 11 (US$4)
(IDE, 2003a). The only drawback will be the known limited useful lifetime of the kit, as
the plastics degrade under the hot Brazilian sun. At such a low capital cost for
replacement, and with the added incentive of being able to return the used kit for credit
towards a new one, irrigation is affordable even to those of limited means and no regular
income. If the market turned out to be large enough to warrant a regional distribution or
manufacturing center, additional opportunities could be created. So at a very different
manufacturing scale from the pote-no-pote, the mass-producible irrigation kit can meet
another important community need.
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Learning about local technology
Local solutions to daily problems are developed all over the world. Many of them were
created to solve one problem in one small location, but could be applied to communities
all over the world that are bound by similar constraints. As a good community partner,
the Grupo de Saide Rural (GSR) not only worked with MIT to implement solutions from
other parts of the world into their daily lives, they also shared their locally developed
solutions. The GSR had two areas in particular for which they had been developing new
technology: water extraction and ventilation.
Water extraction
In the settlements, taking water from the ground is arduous work. Many families still use
unlined wells and carry water up by the bucketful to drag across their land to points of
use. The GSR saw this as an opportunity to create a locally designed solution for a local
problem, and try to implement it in their community. So far, they have designed two
locally appropriate water extraction devices. Both of them use locally available parts to
get water from wells that are between ten and twenty meters deep (Ramos, 2005b).
The first technology works like a pulley, but brings the requisite amount of water much
faster than carrying individual buckets up the well. The only necessary materials are
· A length of PVC pipe
· Plastic bottle-cap-like shapes of the same diameter as the pipe's inner diameter
· Thin rope
* Wood (two by fours)
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* A water storage tank
· A pulley or pulley-like shape, often a bicycle wheel
* A crank or axle.
With these few parts, hours of work can be saved each day. A wooden structure is built
up over the well to hold the water storage tank (Figure 18). The higher the tank, the more
potential the water has and the further it can be piped along to reach gardens, feeding
troughs, and kitchens. The PVC pipe is run from where the water level will be at its
lowest throughout the year. (For Tocantins, the water level varies significantly
throughout the year. For six months out of the year, it rains heavily every day. For the
other six months of the year, there is almost no rain at all, and water tables are
significantly lower.) At the top, the pipe feeds into the water storage container. The rope
is looped up the pipe, into the water storage container, over the pulley, and back down.
Before looping the rope, though, knots are put at regular distances and between each pair
of knots is a cap. A second pipe connected to the storage tank can be used to bring water
back down to faucets or hose connections at ground level.
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Figure 18. GSR students demonstrate the water extraction device they built in the settlements.
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To operate it, instead of lifting one bucket over and over, the user just pulls downward on
the rope. The rope comes up through the pipe, bringing the caps with it. Each cap
pushes water into the pipe, and carries it up to the storage tank. The GSR's current
model can extract fifteen liters of water in one minute.
A second water extraction device was developed by the GSR to allow automatic water
extraction and feed to desired points of use. A rubber hose links the water source and a
storage container. Along the hose are three valves that control the upward flow of the
water. From the storage container, a second hose delivers water from storage to whatever
location it will be used at. It works like a siphon pump, so once pressure is built up,
water will continue to be extracted from the source until the pressure drops too low to
counter the weight of the water. The objective was to design a system that would keep
running automatically once it had been started, as long as the valves were open. The
water pressure in the hose keeps the pump running by creating a suction which pulls
more water along with it. Gravity then pulls the water down to be used.
Right now, this device is still in its prototype stage. The GSR students have been
working with people in the nearby settlements to make it more usable for them, but have
encountered a few obstacles which will need to be met before the project can advance
further. For one, the connections at the valves must be airtight, and with the materials
available, this has been difficult. Having imperfect seals allows water to escape and
reduces the water pressure in the hose. Water pressure can be increased by having a
bigger storage container. The kind that they are using right now forms airtight
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connections easier than others, but is more expensive than the people in the
assentamentos could afford. Taking the design back for refinement will eventually lead
to a water extraction device that meets the technical specifications as well as the
constraints of the community.
Ventilation
The student dormitories at the Escola de Canaund are nice, though simple. One of the
students' common complaints, however, is how hot they get on the inside throughout the
year. The GSR took this as an idea of another challenge in their daily lives that they may
be able to find a solution for.
The normal dorms are made of cement, with open windows, a plain door, and corrugated
roofs. What the GSR hopes to do is cut larger squares near the roof of the building and
add ceiling fans in the center of the room. Hot air would rise in the dorm, and leave
through the sides after being pushed towards the edge of the building by the ceiling fan
(Figure 19).
Figure 19. A cut-away rendition of a ventilated dorm typically made of clay brick with corrugated
tin roofing. A ceiling fan and open spots in side walls would induce air exchange with the outside.
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It follows basic scientific principles, and the idea has also been applied in other cultures
and other eras. This is a perfect example of how technology around the world can be
reinvented to meet the needs of a different age and environment. In this case, a similar
kind of ventilation has been traditionally used to ventilate mosques. Known as wind
towers, or badgirs, there are two main kinds (Figure 20). One catches any wind and
carries it through the lower levels of the building. The second works by sucking hot air
from lower levels and expelling it out the top of the building as it is replaced by cooler air
from lower levels.
Figure 20. Wind Tower (Badgir) at The Aqazadeh's house - Abarghu, Yazd
Their proposed solution differs because of the type of building, the natural environment,
and the size and height of the open spaces. The GSR's ventilated dorm is still in
prototype phase, at a 1:6 model. The students hope to be able to build a model of it the
next time the school adds a building or improves any of the current dorms.
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Each of these technologies solves a problem in the daily life in Tocantins. Although this
is only a small region, their daily challenges are similar to those encountered by millions
(even billions) of people around the world. MIT's knowing about their locally developed
solutions makes it possible to share them with others around the country or even the
world. A large-scale development plan could make significant savings in time and
budget by learning about new technologies at each project site and encouraging the
application of local solutions to other domestic locations.
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Future work
The development in these partner communities does not end here. Fortunately, neither do
the projects that have been started nor does the relationship that has been founded
between MIT, its students, colleagues in Brazil, and the partner communities. Although
in the coming years the faces may change over time, the work will continue.
MIT
Much of this project originated with an MIT class, and then grew from there. The
advantage is clear: in a field where projects all too often have the tendency to start and
then end before being finished, with no plans for economic or technical sustainability, the
long-term relationship between MIT, Canuana, the assentamentos, and thefavelas,
enables projects to continue and grow at MIT before being implemented in Brazil. The
wide range of technical expertise here can also be applied to new projects that are now
known challenges with defined constraints.
D-Lab
D-Lab, the course that these projects started with, has a continuing relationship with the
FundaqAo Bradesco and the Escola de Canuani. MIT students will be returning there
each year to work with the GSR and local communities. As MIT develops new
technologies or learns about solutions from other places around the world, more
technologies can be adapted to meet the needs faced by people everyday in Tocantins.
Two of the projects that may be introduced in the coming year include solar water
bacterial disinfection by exposing water in polyethylene bags to sunlight and bringing
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pedal-powered machines to Tocantins, increasing the usefulness of their bicycles and
simplifying tasks like corn milling.
Source2Sink
This spring, I am working with a group of MIT students which is continuing with the
challenge of providing clean water to the settlements. These three mechanical
engineering undergraduates will be devoting their time through a design class, summer
field work, and their undergraduate theses for 2006. Their design integrates improved
water extraction methods with an experimental prototype for water purification through
sand filters integrated with other built parts of the settlement. Rainwater harvesting,
though common in other parts of the world, is not yet done in Tocantins. Their water will
be collected by rainwater harvesting from the roofs of homes, then stored and run through
a slow sand filter. Slow sand filters have layers of sand, charcoal, and gravel that can
improve water quality by removing turbid solids and bacteria like coliform.
The prototype, including water collection, purification, and transport to points of use, will
be tested in the Tocantins settlements over the summer 2005. Between the engineering
skills from MIT and the practical and regional knowlege of the students at Escola de
Canuani, an improved (and fully functioning) version will be working in the field by next
fall.
Remaining written challenges
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Within Canuand, the assentamentos, and thefavelas that were part of this project, dozens
of challenges remain for acquisition of new technological capability from existing
sources, social organizations, or opportunities for new designs. The projects that are not
currently being worked have been compiled with information like:
· Objective to be met
· Resources available and needed
* Target community, relevant stakeholders, and their involvement
* Relevant design constraints and obstacles
* Potential advantages and risks, for determining most appropriate projects
* Visual documentation
These design challenges will be available to future students working in this community
and others who may work in areas with similar needs and constraints. The objective of
the design challenge is to make it possible for more people to collaborate MIT-side with
partner communities in Brazil. Based on the specifications in the design challenge, future
projects could reach the prototype stage and be developed enough to get support from
different stakeholder groups inside and outside of MIT.
Brazil
By working with other organizations in Brazil, technical design will be able to continue
in the field at Canuand and Sio Paulo. With colleagues from the Universidade de Sio
Paulo, one day it will be feasible to apply technical skills within Brazil's universities to
the challenges faced everyday by people in the interior and in urban communities. Many
Brazilians at university have never explored these other faces of their country. Regional
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development experience may benefit them as much as the community partners they work
with. Projects like those started by MIT and USP now and in future years will have a life
beyond the university's field work. Ensuring the sustainability of the technologies and
programs started goes a long way towards making the community's growth sustainable.
Patient Recordkeeping Project
One of the remaining challenges recorded by MIT is a patient recordkeeping system
customized to meet the needs at two very different locations: within the school Escola de
Canuani, and also for when the school doctor, Cicero, travels through the settlements
volunteering his services. Both sites require a flexible system with additional
information that is not available in off-the-shelf systems. Additionally, the financial
situation of rural Brazil makes the purchase of specialized, proprietary software systems
low priority in the scheme of health care planning.
Thigao Moreira, a USP undergraduate from the computer science department, is
incorporating design specifications from the doctor and administrators. Meeting their
needs is the critical step in creating a useful system for them. For the designer, it is a way
increase project value at the university by incorporating service learning and a real client.
In addition, the beta version will be the first technology developed at USP as part of a
new focus on regional development programs.
USP class
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Further academic and practical developments on regional development are likely to come
about for other students at USP from these experiences. Much of the work presented here
originated in an MIT class, and colleagues at the engineering school of the Universidade
de Sdo Paulo are interested in how a similar project-based development class could be
beneficial to the undergraduates in that university. The objective will be to use a similar
theoretical grounding in development to frame the national needs of Brazil. Brazil's
diversity in geography, resources, community, and culture will be an ideal setting to
understand the challenges of technology in development.
Transition of CID
Transition of the CID management and mentoring duties to the teachers in Canuan is
going well. Within the next two months (i.e. by June 2005), primary responsibility will
be entirely within the village. As the relationship between Canuani and MIT grows, we
will continue to visit the CID and possibly play a role in any new programs that will be
developed at the center.
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Conclusions: A New Brazilian miracle
Industrialization and overall development has not come smoothly to Brazil, but rather in
fits and starts. Particularly in the twentieth century, since the 1930s, government
administrations of all persuasions have tried their hand at turning the former colonial
coffee power and rubber monopoly into a modern industry of manufacturers and service
providers. Brazil is once again in the macroeconomically stable position of being able to
dedicate its policies and funding to continued national development. This time, though,
blind over-industrialization like that undertaken in the twentieth century will not suffice.
The nation needs to address its regional inequalities, rampant poverty, income inequality,
and need for continued sustainable development.
Projects established by MIT and USP in conjunction with community partners in
Tocantins demonstrate the potential for the application of technology to solve local
problems. Increased community participation and ownership of development projects
can subsequently ensure their suitability for a particular region and their sustainability
beyond the initially funded timescale. This is true both for organizational solutions, like
the CID or a farmers' cooperative, or for technical solutions, like the pot-in-pot or drip
irrigation kits. Both types of projects are meant to meet local needs and provide
opportunities for education or employment.
In order for small-scale and diverse, decentralized projects to be favorable on a large
scale, though, the political environment must make them attractive for community
participants, outside agencies, and government branches. The likelihood of coordinating
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such a new paradigm depends on addressing the requirements of very different kinds of
stakeholders that are all needed for its success.
The policy recommendations made here emphasize the need to narrow the gap between
the lower and middle classes for continued economic growth. In combination with
policies addressing the challenge of integrating Brazil into the new knowledge-based
international economy, the nation's overall economic position and its domestic unity can
be increased by investing in human power rather than increased mechanization.
What it is time for is a New Brazilian Miracle. The economic surge in 1969-1973 was
based on huge tax breaks to megacorporations and the growing attractiveness of Brazil to
foreign direct investment. The New Brazilian Miracle, arising from the democratic state,
will focus on growing small businesses and creating new economic opportunities for
those sectors of society that have been passed over in previous decades. This goes
equally for the rural areas as for the city - national development and coordination will be
the focus of the programs, and the exact details will vary depending on the needs and
constraints of the local communities.
The New Brazilian Miracles will bring Brazil to the forefront of growth again. Under a
policy that combines community development of under-served populations with a
commitment to knowledge and innovation, Brazil can expect to realize its potential for
technological and economic development.
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